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IMPROVING THE "KANGAROO COURTS":
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM IN EVALUATING
JUVENILES' WAIVER OF MIRANDA
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, as juvenile crime rates have continued to rise, the
public perceives juveniles as more sophisticated and, therefore, similar to
their adult counterparts.1 This new perception ofjuveniles has led to soci-
ety's view that juveniles are just as deserving of harsh punishment.2 In
addition to harsher sentences, increasingly younger and more immature
juveniles are now transferred to adult courts. 3 With the same amount at
1. See Richard Barnum, Clinical and Forensic Evaluation of Competence to Stand
Tial in Juvenile Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 197 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
("[I]ncreasing concerns about juvenile violence have led to a general increase in
the exposure ofjuvenile defendants to adult sanctions."); see also BARRY KRISBERG &
JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE ix (1993) (detailing Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation report of increased violent crime rates among juveniles from
1985 to 1991 and providing example that number of fifteen year olds arrested for
murder increased by 217% during this period); Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz, Introduction, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIvE ON JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE 1 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (recounting
states' responses to perception that juvenile crime rates were rising by decreasing
gap between juvenile and adult sentences); Laurence Steinberg & Robert G.
Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVrELOPMEN-
TAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 9-10 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000) (discussing policymakers and public's recent reactions to juvenile
crime through implementing harsher sentencing and increased frequency of
transfer to adult court). Furthermore, juveniles can now be sentenced beyond
seventeen or eighteen years old into adulthood rather than simply until they be-
come adults, as in previous years. See id. (describing extension of juvenile
sentences into adulthood); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial
Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 5 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso, Competence]
(stating that youth violence in United States has increased, there is no longer
much disparity between adult and juvenile sentences, and therefore, adolescents
have as much at stake as adults).
2. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 5 (stating juveniles receive adult-like
punishments). For example, one study of registered voters eligible for the jury
pool demonstrated that sixty percent of those polled would recommend execution
of a ten year old for committing murder. See C. Crosby et al., The Juvenile Death
Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An Empirical Investigation of Societal Consensus and
Proportionality, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 245, 245-61 (1995) (finding that sixty per-
cent of sample of eligible voters endorsed capital punishment for ten year olds
found guilty of murder).
3. See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 9-10 (pointing out that juveniles
are increasingly transferred for adjudication as adults); Jennifer L. Woolard & N.
Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles' Capacities as Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL:
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 174 (Thomas Grisso & Robert
G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (stating "adult processing and penalties are increasingly
directed at larger numbers ofjuvenile defendants"); Grisso, Competence, supra note
(629)
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stake, children deserve the same level of protection afforded adults during
interrogation.
4
While children currently receive the same procedural protections as
adults, the psychological literature calls into question whether these pro-
tections function as comparable safeguards when applied tojuveniles.5 As
the system metes out harsher punishments, research indicates that under
current procedures juveniles' waivers often do not meet the "knowing, in-
telligent and voluntary" standard set by the courts.6 Specifically, juveniles'
waivers are often voluntary, but are rarely "knowing" or "intelligent '7 and
without an informed decision, a "voluntary" waiver is meaningless." In or-
der to safeguard juveniles' constitutional rights to the same level afforded
adults, juveniles need increased protection to compensate for deficiencies
present during interrogation.9 If our purpose is truly to ensure that
juveniles' waiver of Miranda rights are "knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary" then we must implement changes to ensure that children have suffi-
cient protections during custodial interrogation. 0
1, at 5 (stating that younger juveniles are being transferred to adult courts for
adjudication). Several methods are used to accomplish the transfer of younger
juveniles to adult courts including: 1) lowering the burden of proof in juvenile
court transfer hearings; 2) increasing the types of offenses that result in transfer;
3) lowering the minimum age for transfer; 4) statutory exclusions or automatic
transfer for certain offenses; and 5) prosecutor's direct file, or allowing the prose-
cutor to transfer the case to adult court at their discretion. See RichardJ. Bonnie &
Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, inYOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 84 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz eds., 2000) (discussing procedures used to transfer juveniles to adult
courts); Grisso Competence, supra note 1, at 5-6 (listing methods used to transfer
juveniles to adult courts). As a result of these new devices, transfer ofjuveniles to
adult courts has risen dramatically. See id. (noting 100% increase in juvenile trans-
fers from 1988 to 1992); see, e.g., Court TV, Murdered Dad Case, at http://www.
courttv.com/trials/king/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) (describing recent case where
juveniles were tried as adults for murder of father).
4. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1134 (1980) (suggesting differences between juve-
nile and adult capacity to understand rights).
5. See id. at 1151-60 (providing results of clinical studies).
6. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (instituting "knowing, in-
telligent, and voluntary" standard for evaluation of Miranda waivers and outlining
specific rights to be included in Miranda warnings, which must be given to suspects
before they may validly waive those rights).
7. See Grisso, supra note 4, at 1166 (concluding juvenile waivers do not have
same effect as those made by adults).
8. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (requiring that suspect's waiver of rights be
made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" and specifying that suspect retains
these rights during entire interrogation and may later, for example, request attor-
ney even after valid waiver and speaking with police).
9. For a review of the psychological literature outlining the processes unique
to juveniles, which interfere with their comprehension of Miranda, see infra notes
105-73 and accompanying text.
10. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (establishing "knowing, intelligent and volun-
tary" as standard to evaluate validity of waiver of Miranda rights).
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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This Note applies psychological literature to question the sufficiency
of the processes adopted by states to assess the validity of juvenile waivers
and proposes a solution to deficiencies in juveniles' waiver of Miranda.1 1
Part II will discuss the background of the interrogation process, the juve-
nile justice system and the evolution of Miranda to provide the reader with
a backdrop against which to evaluate the proposal. 12 Part III will outline
current solutions to the problem of juveniles' lack of comprehension of
Miranda.3 Part IV will review the relevant psychological data. 14 Part V
will propose new solutions in light of the psychological data.1 5 Finally,
Part VI will provide a brief conclusion suggesting that the legal community
must re-evaluate the safeguards afforded tojuveniles during interrogations
if the law is to coincide with current psychological research. 16
II. TREATMENT OF JUVENILES IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE
EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE RIGHTS
Modern interrogation tactics are designed to be coercive. Police are
trained to manipulate interrogations to obtain confessions. Part A of this
section will outline the psychological tactics used by police to obtain con-
fessions from suspects to enable the reader to understand what juveniles
are faced with during interrogation. 17 Part B will then introduce the
reader to the basic rights found to apply to suspects in Miranda v. Ari-
zona'8 and the inception of the juvenile justice system and subsequent
evolution of caselaw that have influenced juveniles' rights in this area. 19
11. For a discussion of the author's proposed solution in light of psychologi-
cal literature, see infra notes 174-217 and accompanying text. This Note focuses
on the literature applicable to waiver of Miranda by juveniles during the interroga-
tion process, but the effect ofjuveniles' lowered capacities does not end with inter-
rogation. See generally YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (examining
juveniles' competence as trial defendants and whether their decreased capacities
should lower their punishment proportionally).
12. For a further discussion of the interrogation process and the evolution of
juveniles' rights during custodial interrogation, see infra notes 20-87 and accompa-
nying text.
13. For a further discussion of current solutions implemented by States to
evaluate the validity ofjuveniles' waiver of their Miranda rights, see infra notes 88-
104 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the psychological data relevant to juveniles'
competence to waive Miranda tinder current procedures, see infra notes 105-73
and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the author's proposed improvements to the
processes employed by States to evaluate juveniles' waiver of Miranda in light of the
psychological data, see infra notes 174-217 and accompanying text.
16. For a brief overview of the major conclusions of the paper, see infra notes
218-19 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of police tactics, see infra notes 20-39 and accompa-
nying text.
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. For further discussion of the history of Miranda and the evolution of
juveniles' rights, see supra notes 40-87 and accompanying text.
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A. The Interrogation Process: The Modern "Third Degree"
A tiny, grey, barren smoke-filled room with only a light bulb swinging
on a cord ... a bright light shone in the suspect's face . . . the flash of a
rubber hose.2z 1 The word interrogation conjures vivid images from popu-
lar media, but modern interrogation does not incorporate the tactics
found in old police movies.2 1 The modern "third degree" employs psy-
chological tactics which, in some ways, are more insidious.
22
Police learn to manipulate situations to obtain confessions. 23 Police
manuals teach officers to create an atmosphere of control by orchestrating
20. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN TIE
COURTROOM 63-64 (1993) (describing images of interrogation from popular cul-
ture including "thumbscrew and rack," "a bright light shone on a suspect's face,"
and "threats of physical force" and explaining that these images contribute to our
stereotypes of interrogation).
21. See id. (asserting that while "such images were accurate in the past" today
they are infrequent in United States); see also RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C.
THOMAS, Ii, THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE & POLICING 66 (1998) ("Although
one occasionally reads or hears about abuses during custodial questioning, police
critics agree that use of the third degree during interrogation is now relatively
infrequent."). But see KXAN-TV 36, Deputy to Face Grand Jury Charges, at http://
www.msnbc.com/local/kxan/m219777.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2002) (providing
example of physical tactics still being used by one officer with juvenile suspect
during interrogation, but implying that physical coercion is not tolerated by other
police).
22. See LEO & THOMAS, supra note 21, at 65 ("Not only do police now openly
and strongly condemn the use of physical force during interrogation, they also
believe that psychological tactics are far more effective at eliciting confessions.").
While physical interrogation or the "third degree" has become extinct, the mod-
ern interrogation process is wrought with purposeful deception. See id. (explain-
ing progression of police coercive techniques from physical to psychological and
delineating current police techniques including "ploys, tricks, stratagems . . . and
methods that rely on manipulation, persuasion, and deception for their efficacy").
One author relates an incident from a Detroit precinct that demonstrates how far
police will go:
It seems the detectives, when confronted with a statement of dubious ve-
racity, would sometimes adjourn to the Xerox room and load three sheets
of paper into the feeder. "Truth," said the first. "Truth," said the second.
"Lie," said the third. Then the suspect would be led into the room and
told to put his hand against the side of the machine. The detectives
would ask the man's name, listen to the answer, then hit the copy button.
Truth. And where do you live? Truth again. And did you or did you not
kill Tater ... ? Lie.
Id. at 61.
23. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 3-204
(3d ed. 1986) (teaching police techniques to obtain confessions). In fact, decep-
tion and lying by police during interrogations is not only legal, but is considered
acceptable. See Matthew B. Johnson & Ronald C. Hunt, The Psycholegal Interface in
Juvenile Assessment of Miranda, 18 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 17, 32 (2000) (citing
J.H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 CRIM. JUST. & ETHICS 40-54 (1982)) (reviewing
Sckolnick's research on acceptable practices in police interrogative tactics). Even
perjury may be considered acceptable behavior in certain police circles when the
police believe that "lying is necessary to reach the 'truth' of a suspect's guilt." See
id. (studying what practices are considered acceptable among police).
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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the interview down to the dress of the interrogator. 24 The officer sets up
the room to increase the likelihood of a confession.
2 5
After the proper atmosphere is established, the interrogator must
seemingly jump the Miranda hurdle, however, in the hands of a skilled
interrogator, Miranda warnings can even add to the desired atmosphere.
2 6
Miranda warnings purport to open the interview with a showing of the
fairness and the reasonableness of the interviewer. 27 Nevertheless, the in-
terrogator may deliver the warnings in a matter-of-fact way, leaving the
impression that they are simply a bureaucratic formality that he or she
must dispose of before the interrogation. 28 This presentation downplays
the significance of the warnings, decreasing the likelihood the suspect will
exercise the rights, which now seem trivial.
29
Finally, the interrogation begins. From the outset of the interview, a
good interrogator ignores assertions of innocence and attempts to keep
24. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 23, at 36 (dictating proper interrogator dress,
including conservative clothes with long sleeves lacking "conspicuous ... accesso-
ries," and removal of any police garb such as "the star, gun, and holster"); LEO &
THOMAS, supra note 21, at 58 ("[A] good interrogator controls the physical envi-
ronment from the moment a suspect or reluctant witness is dumped in the small
cubicle, left alone to stew in soundproof isolation.").
25. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 23, at 29-34 (instructing interrogators to estab-
lish sense of privacy, remove distractions, select proper lighting, minimize noise,
arrange chairs properly, choose chairs that prevent suspect from being relaxed, set
up observation room and also diagramming proper placement of items in room).
Interrogators purposely do not provide any items that might relieve tension such
as small objects to fiddle with; the interrogator sits face to face with the suspect
with no furniture separating them, which might afford the suspect a certain degree
of relief. See id. at 29-37 (directing interrogators to remove all distractions, espe-
cially "small, loose objects" because "tension relieving activities of this sort can de-
tract from the effectiveness of the interrogation" and advising interrogators not to
leave too much space between officer and suspect as this may confer psychological
advantage). Furthermore, police must not take notes, as this could remind the
suspect of the "legal significance" of his situation. See id. at 36 (directing officers to
keep any pens and paper out of suspect's view). Above all, the officer should avoid
giving the impression that he seeks a confession or conviction. See id. (advising it is
better to "fulfill the role of one who is merely seeking the truth").
26. See LEO & THOMAS, supra note 21, at 67 (asserting Miranda can actually
work to advantage of police during interrogation). For a description of Miranda
and suspects' Miranda rights, see infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
27. See LEO & THOMAS, supra note 21, at 67 (describing police delivery of Mi-
randa rights).
28. See id. ("[P]olice routinely deliver the Miranda warnings in a perfunctory
tone of voice and ritualistic behavioral manner... conveying that these warnings
are little more than . . .a triviality.").
29. See id. (explaining that police downplay suspects' Miranda rights). At the
end of the interrogation, when the confession is signed, the form will again con-
tain Miranda warnings that must be waived in written form. See INBAU E'" AL., supra
note 23, at 179 (stating officers must give Miranda second time when formal con-
fession is signed). Again, the police are advised to downplay the importance of the
warnings and discourage assertion of the suspect's rights. See id. ("[R]epeat the
warnings at the beginning of the written confession, making reference, of course,
to the fact that the suspect had received them earlier.").
2003] NOTE 633
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the suspect from denying his or her guilt.3° An interrogator learns to use
themes that are intended to manipulate the suspect.3 ' These techniques
include sympathizing with the suspect, minimizing the seriousness of the
crime or suggesting that the suspect's motivation was morally acceptable.
32
Police can also lie about the evidence that they have, pretending, for ex-
ample, that they have the suspect's fingerprints or an eyewitness. 33 Of-
ficers may even misrepresent their identities or roles claiming to be
psychologists, newspaper reporters or studen ts. 4 Additionally, officers
are trained to diffuse the confidence of professionals and to flatter those
of low socioeconomic status.
35
Police learn to use the same themes when addressingjuveniles as they
use with adults. They are advised that certain types of deceit, such as blam-
ing the child's environment, work most effectively. 36 Further, they should
also manipulate the parents, if present, limiting the parents' role when
possible by giving them the impression that they are merely observers.3
7 If
a parent exhibits a desire to protect his or her child, the interrogator is
30. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 23, at 142-43 (warning that after initial denial,
interrogators should "prevent the suspect from indulging in further denials" which
could provide guilty person with "psychological fortification that would be derived
from repetitious disclaimers of guilt").
31. See id. at 93-141 (outlining "themes" used with emotional suspects,
nonemotional suspects and juveniles).
32. See id. (stating that other themes include condemning others who could
possibly share responsibility, appealing to "suspect's pride by well-selected flattery"
or pointing out fact that victim could exaggerate suspect's actions). These tech-
niques are sometimes implemented using a "Mutt and Jeff" or "good cop, bad cop"
approach where one officer will show disdain for the suspect, while the other ap-
pears to protect him or her in order to gain his or her trust. See id. at 151-53
(describing use of "friendly-unfriendly" tactic and explaining "the psychological
reason for the effectiveness of the ... act is the fact that the contrast between the
two methods used serves to accentuate the friendly, sympathetic attitude").
33. See LEo & Ti-iOMAS, supra note 21, at 70 (stating that police fabricate evi-
dence such as pretending accomplice identified suspect, lying about physical evi-
dence, pretending lie detector test indicated deception or even staging fake
lineups).
34. See id. at 69-70 (noting that courts have sanctioned misrepresentation of
identity technique if constitutional rights or "norms of fairness are violated" and
clarifying that legality of deception turns on role interrogator impersonates, for
example, in past courts have not allowed police to pose as lawyers or priests).
35. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 23, at 39 (stating that addressing those of low
Socio-economic Status (SES) formally will appeal to their sense of flattery, while
avoiding formality with those of high SES will diffuse their normal sense of
"superiority").
36. See id. at 137-38 (suggesting, for example, if child's parents were alcoholics
interrogator might play upon this fact by blaming parents' alcoholism for child's
crime).
37. See id. at 139 (advising interrogator of ways of "dealing with a parent who
has an overprotective attitude toward his or her child," instructing interrogators
that parents "present during the interrogation should be advised to refrain from
talking, confining his or her function to that of an observer" and recommending
police "proceed with the interrogation as though he were alone with suspect").
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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told to handle this by eliciting the parent's cooperation.3 8 Interrogators
are taught to tell parents that they only want to find the truth, and not
reveal to the parents "all that is known" about the child's participation. 39
B. History of Miranda
1. Miranda: The Basic Concept
In the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona, 41 the Supreme Court
created a system to protect suspects within the purposely-coercive atmos-
phere of the police station. 4 1 The Court created a formal process of advis-
ing suspects of their constitutional rights during custodial interrogation to
ensure that waiver of these rights by a suspect was "knowing, intelligent
and voluntary."42 Miranda held that the accused must be allowed certain
rights and, in order for those rights to be effective, the suspect must be
informed of those rights and understand their meaning. 43 The Miranda
Court ruled that to consider a confession admissible at trial the police
must "demonstrate the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. '44
38. See id. (directing officer to assure parents that no one blames them for
their child's crime, remind parents that all children do things to disappoint their
parents and tell parents that no one believes they were negligent in their child's
upbringing).
39. See id. (counseling interrogators to "advise parents that there is a basis for
wanting to conduct the interrogation").
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. See id. at 478-79 (holding that when "an individual is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities ... [and] is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural
safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege"). Historically, the courts
did not analyze the admissibility of confessions in terms of due process and the
Fifth Amendment. It was not until Bram v. United States that the Supreme Court
first began to look at the validity of a suspect's confession within the ambit of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 542-65 (1897) (analyzing admissibility of confessions under Fifth Amend-
ment and Due Process Clause). Between Brain and Miranda the Court decided a
succession of cases, each adding their own judicial gloss to the "voluntary" stan-
dard. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1964) (extending rights
beyond trial process and into custodial interrogation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 6 (1964) (holding that in criminal cases, states must honor constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963)
(holding that Sixth Amendment right to counsel is made obligatory on states by
Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (deter-
mining confession's admissibility based upon Fourteenth Amendment's due pro-
cess requirements); see also KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 439-640
(9th ed. 1999) (discussing Miranda, its predecessors and its progeny).
42. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that suspect's waiver must be made
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently").
43. See id. ("Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to ... an attorney.").
44. See id. (ensuring Fifth Amendment protections are secured).
7
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The Court found that in order to comply with these safeguards, the
interrogator must apprise the accused of: (1) his or her right to remain
silent; (2) the fact that any statement can be used against him or her in
court; and (3) his or her right to an attorney before and during question-
ing and at trial, even if he or she cannot afford one.4 5 Only after the
interrogator informs him or her of these rights may a suspect validly
waive 4 6 them and agree to speak with the police. 47 If at any time the sus-
pect wishes to speak to an attorney, the questioning must cease until his
attorney is present.4 8 Any statement obtained by violating these rules is
considered inadmissible against the accused in court.4 9
2. The Evolution of Juvenile Rights
In the late 1800's, 50 long before the advent of Miranda, reform-
ers expressed shock at the treatment of children within the adult sys-
45. See id. (outlining rights of accused during interrogation that must be fol-
lowed to ensure knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights).
46. A "waiver" is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (defin-
ing waiver); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Zerbst
definition of waiver).
47. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 ("After such warnings have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may... waive these rights and agree
to answer questions or make a statement.").
48. See id. at 444-45 ("If... [the accused] indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning.").
49. See id. at 479. ("Unless and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against [the accused].").
50. SeeJulian W. Mack, The Juvenile Cour, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909)
(discussing birth ofjuvenile justice system). Illinois's passage of the Juvenile Court
Act in April 1899 created the first separate state system for the adjudication of
juveniles; its ideology spread quickly. See WILLIAM VAUGIN STAPLETON & LEE E.
TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
JUVENILE COURTS 1 (1972) (stating thatjuvenile court began in Illinois in 1899 and
revolutionized court system). By 1925 all but two states had enacted similar legisla-
tion. See SOL RUBIN, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2
(1986) ("Within a dozen years 22 states had followed the example of Illinois, and
by 1925 there were juvenile courts in every state but two."). Ten years later, thirty
American jurisdictions as well as several foreign courts had adopted similar sepa-
rate juvenile systems. See id. (describing spread of juvenile court philosophy). A
typical statute created during this period stated "the court may conduct the hear-
ing in an informal manner and may adopt any form of procedure in such cases
which it deems best suited to ascertain the facts." PAUL R. KFOURY, CHILDREN
BEFORE THE COURT: REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING MINORS 43 (1987).
For the original Illinois Act, see 1899 Il1. Laws, 131-37; see also MONRAO G. PAULSON,
PROBLEMS OF THE JUVENILE COURTS AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 14-17 (1975)
(reprinting excerpt of original statute).
While many states implemented juvenile justice systems during this period,
each did so in its own way. See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 15 (outlining
different ways in which juvenile courts were implemented). Each system has
unique methods, programs and policies. See id. (delineating variations in juvenile
8
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tem.5 1 At that time, children above age seven were adjudicated within
adult courts, subject to the same arrest, trial and sentencing, but also pro-
vided with the same protections. 5 2 Dissatisfied with the current proce-
dures, reformers felt that the legal system should not treat children like
their adult counterparts; reformers believed that the justice system needed
to instate juvenile procedures with a social welfare philosophy. 53
systems). Depending upon the state, children may be diverted to the juvenile jus-
tice system as young as seven and as old as ten and the jurisdiction of the juvenile
courts may end as young as sixteen or as old as twenty-five. See id. (explaining
differing ages for diversion to juvenile courts).
51. See DOUGLAS J. BESFIAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRACTICE IN A
UNIQUE COURT 1 (1974) (explicating reasons for creation of juvenile system).
While an extensive review of the history of the juvenile courts is beyond the scope
of this Note, more thorough treatments of this topic are available. See id. (recount-
ing evolution ofjuvenile courts, failure ofjuvenile system and Supreme Court deci-
sions concerning juvenile rights); see also KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 1-52
(detailing history of disciplining youth beginning with Middle Ages through birth
ofjuvenile court, its philosophy and demise and explaining how social factors such
as urbanization, conflicts between races and economic changes influence treat-
ment of children within judicial system). For an interesting discussion of the de-
velopment of childhood and its status as a malleable, changing sociocultural
construct, see GENNARO F. VITO & DEBORAH G. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 13-16 (1985) (detailing development of childhood as construct and
its changing status over time and explaining that concept of childhood did not
exist until Middle Ages); see also generally ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS
(1978) (chronicling history of creation of juvenile courts, assumptions behind
them and their deviation from ideal upon which reformers created them).
52. See STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 50, at I ("At common law a
youth who violated the law was treated much the same as an adult."); see also Mack,
supra note 50, at 106-07 (stating that, historically, children and adults were treated
alike in criminal system).
Generally, at common law, children below age seven were considered incapa-
ble of forming the criminal intent required to commit a crime. See STAPLETON &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 50, at I ("Children below the age of seven were conclu-
sively presumed incapable of [forming criminal intent]."). Children above age
fourteen were treated as fully responsible adults. See id. at 1 ("Youths over fourteen
were presumed capable of entertaining a criminal intent and were held responsi-
ble to the same extent as an adult."). Between the ages of seven and fourteen a
rebuttable presumption exists that the child is capable of forming intent to com-
mit a crime. SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 657 (2d
ed. 1999) (citing LAFAVE & SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAw 398 (2d ed. 1986)) (stating be-
tween seven and fourteen children could be considered culpable for their crimes).
53. See Mack, supra note 50, at 107 (discussing underlying aspirations of advo-
cates for juvenile court system, specifically that juveniles would not be "punished,
[but] reformed"); see also BESHAROV, supra note 51, at 1 (1974) (asserting that crea-
tion ofjuvenile courts "is generally accepted to have been the product of a reform
movement concerned with the welfare of children"). But see id. at 1 (citing San-
ford Fox,Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1195
(1970)) (providing alternative perspective of development of juvenile courts, ex-
pounding revisionist view of origins of court system and concluding that courts
were "not simply a manifestation of humanitarian concern for children needing
help" but instead sprang from "(1) a retrenchment in correctional practice, (2) a
regression in poor-law policy, (3) a reaction to the phenomenon of immigration,
and (4) a reflection of the repressive side of Quaker education"); PAULSON, supra
2003] NOTE 637
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Under this new policy, since the parents failed in their custodial role,
the justice system would act as parens patriae. 54 The courts would develop
an entirely separate system to try a child, the goal of which was not to
punish, but to reform the child.5 5 Judges and prosecutors would act in
the child's interest, with understanding and protection so that the child
felt cared for rather than disciplined. 56 Because the system was intended
to help rather than punish, even though juveniles were often deprived of
their freedom, reformers thought juveniles did not need the same proce-
dural protections afforded adults.
57
note 50, at 1-2 (suggesting A.M. PLATT, THIE CHILD SAVERS 98-99, 135 (1969) as
alternative view of juvenile justice reform movement).
54. See STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 50, at 9-23 (discussing doctrine
of parens patriae and its application tojuvenile system to supplant what was seen as
ineffective family unit); see also Mack, supra note 50, at 109 (asserting that state
should intervene when "parent is either unwilling or unable to train the child
properly").
According to Black's Law Dictionary parens patriae is defined as "the state
regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity of provider of protection to those
unable to care for themselves." BLXCK's LAw DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
This Latin term, which literally means "father of his country," was originally used
to justify the English kings' intrusion into the lives of children of their vassals,
under the guise of looking after their welfare. See BESHAROV, supra note 51, at 2
(discussing history and meaning of term parens patriae). Eventually, it became
synonymous with the need to intervene for the child's welfare and currently it
means the state's need to interfere to protect the young, incompetent or helpless.
See id. (explaining meaning of parens patriae today). For a further discussion of
Gault and how the Supreme Court in Gault would come to view this parens patriae
justification for withholding juvenile's rights during adjudication as dubious, see
infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
55. See Mack, supra note 50, at 119-20 (focusing on "what is [the child], how
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from a downward career" rather than on "whether
the child is guilty or innocent"); see also BESHAROV, supra note 51, at 2 (stating
mutual aim of courts and reformers was to help juveniles in trouble).
56. See Mack, supra note 50, at 120 (making child feel cared for should be goal
ofjIvenile courts). This new system was conceptualized as civil rather than crimi-
nal due to its non-adversarial nature. See STAPLETON & TEITELIBAUM, supra note 50,
at 2 ("The hearing itself was to be as ... non-adversary as possible with the empha-
sis on determining what disposition would best suit the child's particular needs.").
It was also intended to lack the formality of traditional adult courts. See KFOURY,
supra note 50, at 43 ("[A]n informal, flexible process replaced the rigidity of the
adult criminal court."). To reduce the stigma associated with the criminal system,
a new vocabulary was also invented. See RUBIN, supra note 50, at I ("Petition instead
of complaint, summons instead of warrant, initial hearing instead of arraignment, find-
ing of involvement instead of conviction, disposition instead of sentence.").
57. See Mack, supra note 50, at 109-10 (justifying denial of constitutional rights
to children in juvenile court system); see also KFOURY, supra note 50, at 43 (stating
reformers thought procedural protections would interfere with helping child with
problems and were "an unnecessary vestige of the adversary system"). Early consti-
tutional challenges to the juvenile system focused on this lack of procedural pro-
tections, justified by the parental nature of the system. See id. at 43-45 (giving
examples of early constitutional challenges to juvenile court system such as Exparte
Sharp, 96 P. 563 (1908) and Commonwealth v. Fischer, 62 A. 198 (1905), which fo-
cused on lack of procedural protections forjuveniles compared to adults); see also
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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Despite its well-intentioned beginnings, the juvenile justice system
failed to meet its laudable goals of providing children with rehabilitation
rather than discipline. 58 Straining under the pressures of understaffed
agencies and an abundant caseload, the system envisioned by reform-
minded advocates did not come to fruition. 5 9 Rather than the envisioned
fatherly judge putting his arm around a child and getting to the bottom of
his troubles, a harsh adversarial process developed in which punishment
was meted out without the procedural safeguards afforded adults.61) The
juvenile court was not the therapeutic panacea that reformers had
envisioned.
6 1
Accordingly, at least eighteen years before Miranda, the Supreme
Court began a succession of cases that afforded juveniles protection dur-
ing interrogation. 62 As early as 1945, in Haley v. Ohio,63 the Court recog-
nized the special protections that the justice system needed to afford
children due to their immaturity and, consequently, their detrimental po-
sition during interrogation. 6 4 The Court stated that when a child is before
the court "special care in scrutinizing the record must be used" because "a
STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 50, at 16 (stating juveniles' lack of procedu-
ral protections became primary challenge to juvenile courts).
58. See BESHAROV, supra note 51, at 4-5 (discussing demise of juvenile court
system); see also STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 50, at 23 (chronicling height-
ening criticism of philosophy behind juvenile system and eventual revision by Su-
preme Court decisions conferring rights upon juveniles, such as In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967) and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)); Birch Bayh, Juveniles
v. Justice, in LEGAL RIGi TS OF CHILDREN: STATUS, PROGRESS, AND PROPOSALS 21-30
(1973) (detailing failures of juvenile justice system).
59. See BESHAROV, supra note 51, at 4 ("From the start, juvenile courts have
been denied the necessary staff, operating hands, auxiliary services and facilities to
fulfill their rehabilitative purpose.").
60. See ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEsT-LAID PLANS 147 (1978) (noting that juvenile
justice system lacked procedural protections of adult system).
61. See id. (noting juvenile system's imperfections).
62. See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (deciding that
probation officer did not stand in same position as attorney when minor invoked
Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda); In. re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-59 (1967)
(requiringjuvenile court adjudication of delinquency to "measure up to the essen-
tials of due process..."); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (holding
that basic due process applied to waiver decisions); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49, 54-55 (1962) (concluding 14-year old needed adult protection against inequal-
ity between minor and police); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (holding
methods used to obtain 15-year old defendant's confession violated due process
requirements).
63. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
64. See Haley, 332 U.S. at 596 (recognizing need for increased protection for
juveniles during interrogation). In Haley, a fifteen-year-old boy was interrogated at
the police station from midnight until five a.m. See id. at 598 (stating facts of case).
Five or six police officers grilled him in teams of one or two at a time. See id.
During the entire time of the questioning, the Court points out that the boy was
allowed to confer with "no friend or counsel." Id. At five a.m., Haley signed a
confession after being confronted with the alleged confessions of the other sus-
pects. See id. He was not advised of his right to counsel, other than a brief state-
ment at the top of the confession form which stated:
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mere child" is an "easy victim of the law."'65 Thus, the Court determined it
could not hold a child to adult standards of maturity in stressful situa-
tions.66 To the contrary, what "would leave a man cold and unimpressed
can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens."6 7 While a mature
adult might withstand lengthy questioning in the middle of the night, a
child was not "a match for the police in such a contest."
68
Due to the juvenile's youth and lack of maturity, the Haley Court sug-
gested that the child needed the help of a trusted adult, like a parent,
"during the critical hours of questioning" so that the "overpowering pres-
ence of the law ... [may not] crush him." 6 9 In addition, the Court im-
plied that a lawyer may be necessary to help a juvenile understand his or
her rights.
7 11
[W]e want to inform you of your constitutional rights, the law gives you
the right to make this statement or not as you see fit. It is made with the
understanding that it may be used at a trial in court either for or against
you or anyone else involved in this crime with you, of your own free will
and accord, you are under no force or duress or compulsion and no
promises are being made to you at this time whatsoever.
Id. Following the confession, Haley was put in jail on October 20, 1948 and held
incommunicado for three days. See id. Police did not allow his mother or his law-
yer to confer with him. See id. He was not taken before a magistrate until October
23rd, three days after he signed the formal confession. See id. at 598-99 (describing
procedure government subjected Haley to during and after interrogation). At trial
the judge allowed the jury to hear the confession, but instructed them to disregard
it if they felt the boy had not made it voluntarily. See id. at 599 (stating judge's
instnlctions to jury). The jury convicted him. See id. (noting conviction later
overruled).
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction declaring that the methods
used to obtain the confession violated the due process clause requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 601 (holding that pressure exerted upon
juveniles, to extent that police effectively withhold their rights, violates Fourteenth
Amendment). The Court held that considering the boy's age, the time and dura-
tion of his interrogation, and the fact that he had no adult present to advise him
led to the conclusion that the confession was coerced. See id. (prohibiting "police
from using the private, secret custody of either man or child as a device for wring-
ing confessions from them").
65. Id. at 599.
66. See id. ("Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy .... [A child]
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity.").
67. Id.
68. See id. at 600 (maintaining that children are at disadvantage compared to
adults during interrogation).
69. See id. (asserting that presence of parents or another trusted adult would
provide protection for juveniles during questioning). The interested adult rule,
later implemented by some States as a method of assessing the validity ofjuvenile
waivers of Miranda, mirrors this Supreme Court comment. See id. (asserting adult
should be present during interrogation). For further discussion of the interested
adult rule, see infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
psychological literature indicating the ineffectiveness of the interested adult rule;
see infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text.
70. See Haley 332 U.S. at 601 (indicating children may need counsel to under-
stand their rights). The Court discussed the claim that the boy was supposedly
advised of his rights before signing the confession, however, it then said that this
640 [Vol. 48: p. 629
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In 1962, the Court again considered the rights of juveniles during
interrogation in Gallegos v. Colorado.7 1 The Court, analogizing to Haley,
recognized that the immaturity, suggestibility and inequality of a child
compared to the police put the juvenile on "unequal footing with his in-
terrogators."7 2 The Court again reiterated its belief that an adult, present
during questioning, would aid the child in comprehending his rights and
the consequences of waiving them. 73 Consequently, to compensate for
youth and immaturity, the Court held that, in cases involving juveniles, it
should evaluate the "totality of the circumstances." 74 Under this test, to
determine whether due process was violated, the courts would examine
factors including "the youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the fail-
assumes that "a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full apprecia-
tion of that advice and ... he had a freedom of choice." Id. (stating children may
need counsel to effectively utilize their rights).
71. 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962). In Gallegos, a fourteen-year-old boy, was ar-
rested on January 1, 1959. See id. at 50 (describing facts of case). The following
day his mother tried to visit him, but was denied entry. See id. Police questioned
the suspect and he confessed on the next day. See id. (describing circumstances of
confession). The police held the suspect at a Juvenile Hall until January 7, 1959
when the formal confession was signed; he had been separated from any friendly
adult for five consecutive days. See id. (recounting facts of case). This confession
became the key piece of evidence in the boy's conviction, which was later over-
turned by the Supreme Court. See id. (stating procedural history).
72. See id. at 54 (finding juvenile was in inferior position during interroga-
tion). The Court stated:
[A] 14-year-old-boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any
conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to
the police .... [W]e deal with a person who is not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and
answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protest his
own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights ....
He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.
Id. Further, it would be "callous disregard of this boy's constitutional rights" not to
take account of the boy's youth, immaturity and the length of his detention. Id.
73. See id. (asserting trusted adult might aid children during interrogation).
Unless a child had the benefit of the advice of an adult friend such as a parent or
lawyer to give them the "protection which [their] own immaturity could not[,]"
then a child could not understand, let alone assert, his constitutional rights. See id.
(implying children need guidance of trusted adult in order to make rational deci-
sions). The Court stated:
He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confes-
sion were without advice as to his rights-from someone concerned with
securing him those rights-and without the aid of more mature judg-
ment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which he found
himself .... Without some adult protection against this inequality, [a
child] would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional
rights as he had.
Id. The rule implied by the Court is similar to the interested adult standard imple-
mented by some states to assess the validity ofjuveniles' waiver of Miranda. For a
further discussion of the interested adult standard, see infra notes 96-99 and ac-
companying text.
74. See id. at 55 (using totality of circumstances to evaluate juveniles' Miranda
waiver).
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ure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before
the judge of the Juvenile Court, [and] the failure to see to it that he had
the advice of a lawyer or friend. '
75
In In re Gault,76 the Court began to officially take notice of the adver-
sarial nature and special protections needed for juveniles in light of the
failure of the juvenile justice system. 7 7 Condemning the frequent practice
of denying juveniles the rights granted to adults, the Supreme Court de-
clared that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone." 78 The Court recognized that the unfettered discretion
of juvenile courtjudges, no matter how well intentioned, did not provide
75. Id.
76. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-59 (1967) (granting additional protection to
juveniles at adjudicatory stage of trial process including notice of charges, right to
counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and privilege
against self-incrimination). In Gault, police picked up the juvenile for making
"lewd or indecent remarks" over the phone during prank telephone calls to his
neighbor. See id. at 4 (stating charge against Gault). His mother later discovered
his absence and, upon arriving at the station house to look for her son, was in-
formed that there would be a hearing the next day. See id. (describing parents'
discovery of arrest). At the hearing in the judge's chambers, the complainant was
not present, the proceedings were not recorded and no witnesses were sworn in.
See id. at 5 (describing lack of normal safeguards). During the hearing, Gault was
questioned regarding the phone call, and then was taken back to the Detention
Home. See id. at 6 (describing child's detention). After being held for three or
four days after his initial detainment, Gault was released without explanation. See
id. (stating facts of case). At a second hearing, Gault was later committed to the
State Industrial School until the age of twenty-one "unless sooner discharged by
due process of law[,]" essentially a six year sentence. See id. at 7-8 (explaining
sentence). An adult, at worst, would have suffered a fine of five to fifty dollars or
up to two months in jail for the same offense. See id. at 9 (comparing adult and
juvenile sentences for same offense).
77. See id. at 14-31 (outlining juvenile court goals of rehabilitating juvenile
delinquents, but clarifying that these goals never came to fruition and condemn-
ing actual process that has resulted for procedural arbitrariness and lack of protec-
tion for juveniles).
Prior to Gault, the Supreme Court decided a similar case, Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966) and recognized the need for protections within the juvenile
system; the Court decided that case on statutory, rather than constitutional
grounds, thereby limiting its holding. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 (stating rationale
for holding). Consequently, that case did not have the far-reaching effects of
Gault, but did foreshadow the Gault decision. See id. (declining to address issues
later tackled in Gault).
78. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 (stressing importance of procedural rights for
juveniles). The Court listed the procedural deficiencies of the juvenile courts and
explained their roots in the juvenile justice reform movement of the early 1900s,
however, the Court also explained that while the intentions of reformers were en-
lightened, the result was not the compassionate treatment desired. See id. at 14-17
(describing failure ofjuvenile courts). Additionally, the Court delineated the im-
portance of procedural protections within the justice system and clarified that revi-
sions through the addition of protections will not supplant any benefits to
children, but will augment them. See id. at 19-27 (justifying procedural protections
for juveniles).
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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the protection envisioned by the juvenile justice system's creators.79 Con-
sequently, the Court needed to implement procedural protections be-
cause "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court."' ' "
To remedy the "kangaroo courts," the decision in Gault greatly in-
creased the rights ofjuveniles. 81 Juveniles were granted the right to notice
of the charges against them, the right to an attorney even if they could not
afford one when their freedom may be curtailed and the right against self-
incrimination. 82
Fare v. Michael C.,83 decided in 1979, marks the Supreme Court's most
recent word on the rights afforded juveniles during police interrogation.84
In Fare, the Court reiterated and applied its "totality of the circumstances"
79. See id. at 18 (criticizing juvenile courts for their lack of procedural protec-
tion forjuveniles and explaining that child status does not mean that one does not
receive Constitutional protection).
80. See id. at 28 (finding procedural protections were needed for juveniles
during custodial interrogation).
81. See id. at 30-31. (reiterating that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process is
required during juvenile court adjudications of delinquency). Gault specifically
limited the rights granted to adjudicatory proceedings and intentionally did not
extend these rights to custodial interrogation. See id. at 31 (limiting holding to
adjudication). Nevertheless, despite the fact that Gault specifically left open the
question of whether the rule expounded applied to pre-trial procedures, most
states interpreted Gault as extending the rights granted in Miranda to juveniles. See
Thomas Grisso & Sam Manoogian, Juveniles' Comprehension of Miranda Warnings, in
NEw DIREcTiONS IN PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH 127, 128 (Paul D. Lipsitt & Bruce Den-
nis Sales, eds. 1980) (discussing interpretation of Gault by states to extend Miranda
rights, previously only granted to adults, to juveniles). For further discussion of
Miranda and the procedural protections that it granted, see supra notes 40-49 and
accompanying text.
82. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-59 (granting rights to juveniles including assis-
tance of counsel, appellate review and transcript of proceedings, written notice of
charge, allegations and date of hearing in time to prepare for proceeding).
83. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
84. See id. at 728 (discussing juvenile's rights during custodial interrogation
and applying totality of circumstances test). In Fare, during interrogation, the de-
tained sixteen-year-old boy requested to speak to his probation officer. See id. at
710 (describing interrogation). This request was denied. See id. (describing isola-
tion ofjuvenile). Police did offer to let him speak to an attorney, to which the boy
replied "[h]ow I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an
attorney?" Id. at 711.
At trial, the child's attorney argued that the boy's request for his probation
officer was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See id. at
712-13 (describing attorney's defense strategy). The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the child did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights by requesting to
speak to his probation officer. See id. (holding question of waiving right to remain
silent is "one of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis"). The Court ex-
plained that the right to counsel under Miranda is based on the unique position of
an attorney as "protector of... legal rights." See id. at 719 (asserting attorney holds
important position in society). Furthermore, unlike a parent, the probation of-
ficer is an employee of the state with obligations averse to the juvenile's best inter-
ests. See id. at 720 (explaining reasons probation officer differs from attorney).
Probation officers are required to report offenses by the juvenile to the state, thus
15
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test,8 5 but declined by a 5-4 margin to extend Miranda beyond its existing
bounds.86 Nonetheless, the Court did note the crucial role that attorneys
play in our legal system:
[T]he lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system be-
cause of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights
of a client undergoing custodial interrogation... [T] he lawyer is
the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector
of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police
and the courts.87
III. THREE APPROACHES DEVISED TO ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF JUVENILES'
WAIVER OF MIRANDA: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
GAULT BY THE STATES
While the Gault Court laid out the bare minimum constitutional
requirements to protect juveniles during the custodial interrogation proc-
ess, the states were free to implement the standard in their own ways, as
long as they did not go below the minimum.8 8 While some states re-
tamined the "totality of the circumstances," other states invoked the spirit
of Gault to implement more creative plans. 89 These creative plans
creating a conflict of interest. See id. (clarifying rationale for denial of extension of
Miranda).
85. See id. at 725 (applying totality of circumstances test). The Court stated
that the waiver should be weighed in light of all the factors laid out implicitly in
Gault including the child's age, experience, education, background, intelligence
and whether he understood the warnings and the implications of waiving his
rights. See. id. (delineating factors for court to consider). Applying all of these
factors, the Court concluded that the child's waiver of his rights was "knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary" in light of the lack of evidence of coercion. See id. at
728 (holding rights were voluntarily waived).
86. See id. (declining to extend Miranda beyond its current boundaries). The
Court, however, expressly assumed that Miranda applied in Fare. See id. at 717
(" [W] e assume without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully applicable
to the present proceedings."). The Court then declined to say that a request for a
probation officer was equivalent to a request for an attorney under Miranda. See id.
at 728 (distinguishing roles of probation officer and attorney).
87. Id. at 719.
88. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] State is free as a matter
of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court
holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards."). Additionally, "a
State may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional
law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them." Id.
89. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2002) (implementing interested
adult standard). While the three approaches discussed in this section represent
the major ways the states implemented protections for juveniles in their Miranda
waivers, other methods were implemented in conjunction with them in certain
instances. Two examples of solutions devised by the states are videotaping of con-
fessions and juvenile waiver forms. See Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation of Chil-
dren and State Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the MTV Generation?, 26 U. TOL. L.
REV. 901, 925-34 (1995) (discussing use of videotaped confessions and advocating
their use); see also Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Mi-
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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were intended to provide more protection to juveniles during interroga-
tions.
9 0
A. The "Totality of the Circumstances" Approach
The totality of the circumstances, in the majority of jurisdictions, de-
termines the validity of juveniles' waiver of their Miranda rights.9 1 In this
randa, and the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 118 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
(discussing use of simplified waiver forms).
Juvenile waiver forms provide a standardized statement of Miranda in an eas-
ier to understand form so that the child is more likely to comprehend their rights.
See id.. (explaining simplified form for children). Two studies address whether
juveniles' comprehension is improved by using simplified words, but neither study
provides evidence that these forms aid juveniles' understanding. See A. Bruce Fer-
guson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39,
54 (1970) (concluding there was no difference in understanding between standard
Miranda warning and simplified form); see also Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at
30 (citing S. Manoogian, Factors Affecting Juveniles' Comprehension of Miranda
Rights (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, Missouri) (on
file with author)).
Johnson & Hunt advocate the use of taped interrogations to secure juveniles
constitutional rights. SeeJohnson & Hunt, supra note 23, at 32-33 (advocating elec-
tronic recording of interrogations). They state that the entire period of custodial
questioning should be recorded, not simply the confession itself, in order to aid
courts in determining the suspect's competence to waive Miranda and resolve any
questions about the reliability of a defendant's statement. See id. at 33 (discussing
positive aspects and arguments and counterarguments for proposal to videotape
interrogations of juveniles); see also Feld, supra at 118 (discussing use of videotape
in drunk driving cases and suggesting its application to juvenile confessions); Bar-
bara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?
J. CTR. FOR CHILD. & CTS. 151, 158 (1999) (promoting use of videotaped interroga-
tions and confessions, but clarifying that care must be taken not to use biasing
camera angles).
90. See Feld, supra note 89, at 117 (delineating states' rationales for interested
adult rule).
91. See generally ALA. Juv. P. 11 (2002) (using totality of the circumstances
test); ExparteWhisenant, 466 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 1985) (same); State v.J.R.N., 861
P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993) (same); State v. Scholtz, 791 P.2d 1070 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990) (same); In re Bonnie H., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (same);
State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1985) (same); Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922
(Ga. 1976) (same); State v. Doe, 963 P.2d 392 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (same); In re
L.L., 693 N.E.2d 908 (Il1. App. Ct. 1998) (same); State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373
(Me. 1982) (same); McIntyre v. State, 526 A.2d 30 (Md. 1987) (same); State v.
Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1998) (same); McGowan v. State, 706 So. 2d 231
(Miss. 1997) (same); In reA.D.R., 603 S.W.2d 575 (Mo. 1980) (same); Elvik v. State,
965 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1998) (same); State v. Gibson, 718 P.2d 759 (Or. Ct. App.
(1985) (same); State v. Lambert, 705 A.2d 957 (R.I. 1997) (same); In re Williams,
217 S.E.2d 719 (S.C. 1975) (same); State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269 (S.D. 1983)
(same); State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998) (same); Grogg v. Com-
monwealth 371 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Theriault v. State, 223
N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1974) (same); Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238 (Wyo. 1997) (same).
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approach, courts weigh a variety of factors to determine whether the juve-
nile's waiver was "knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
'
"92
Nine factors are generally considered in the totality standard: (1) age
of the child; (2) education level; (3) thejuvenile's knowledge of the "sub-
stance of the charge and nature of his right to consult with an attorney";
(4) whether the child was held incommunicado; (5) whether the child was
"interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed"; (6) methods
of interrogation; (7) length of interrogation; (8) whether the accused pre-
viously refused to give voluntary statements; and (9) whether the juvenile
recanted his "extrajudicial statement at a later date."9 3 Age is only one
factor considered by the court and no single factor is controlling.94 If, by
balancing these factors, the court determines the statement was "knowing,
intelligent and voluntary," then it is admissible against the defendant.
9 5
92. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968) (restating
standard set by Supreme Court in Gault thatjuveniles' waivers of Miranda must be
"knowing, intelligent and voluntary").
93. See id. at 469 (listing factors considered in totality of circumstances
standard).
94. See id. (expounding application of factors considered under totality of cir-
cumstances test). Commentators often point out that one deficiency of this test is
that it is difficult to determine from court decisions how these factors are weighed.
See Grisso & Manoogian, supra note 81, at 130 (noting 'judicial assumptions re-
garding any single variable .. .as an index of competence[,]" how much weight
was given to each factor and "which [factors] were viewed as critical to the conclu-
sion" is "difficult to discern from ... case law").
95. See West, 399 F.2d at 469-70 (applying totality test to facts of case to find
confession could be introduced at trial). Legal commentators have criticized this
approach for a variety of reasons. Their primary concerns are: (1) it leaves too
much discretion to judges; (2) it only protects juveniles retrospectively; (3) police
have no clear rule to follow; (4) courts are overly conservative in its application;
and (5) factors are not applied consistently. See Schlam, supra note 89, at 912-14
(listing concerns such as substantial discretion of judges, courts conservative appli-
cation and failure to provide guidance for police); Penelope Alyssa Brobst, Note,
The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: State v. Fernandez-Returning Louisi-
ana's Children to the Adult Standard, 60 LA. L. REV. 605, 623 (2000) (noting unbri-
dled discretion of judges); David T. Huang, Note, Less than Unequal Footing: State
Courts' Per Se Rules for Juveniles Waivers During Interrogations and the Case for their
Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. Rrv. 437, 448-49 (2001) (condemning totality test
for creating speculation among police about admissibility of statements and only
protecting juveniles retrospectively); Lisa M. Krzewinski, Note, But I Didn't Do it:
Protecting the Rights ofJuveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. TiHI[RD WORLD L.J. 355,
370-71 (2002) (voicing problems including only protecting juveniles retrospec-
tively and inconsistency of application); Elizabeth Maykut, Note, Who is Advising
Our Children: Custodial Interrogation ofJuveniles in Florida, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1345,
1355-56 (1994) (expressing concern over lack of guidance for police and unfet-
tered discretion of judges); Robert E. McGuire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juve-
nile Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53 VAND. L.
R V. 1355, 1377-78 (2000) (criticizing inflexible application of Fare test).
[Vol. 48: p. 629646
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B. The Per Se Approach or "Interested Adult" Standard: A Creative Solution
While states must provide the minimal amount of protection man-
dated by the Constitution, they are free to provide more protection. 96 As
an attempt to provide this additional protection to minors during custo-
dial interrogation, some states have implemented "per se" rules. 97 States
using this formula, automatically exclude any statement made by a juve-
nile without an opportunity to consult with an "interested adult," such as a
parent, close family member or attorney.98 These states believe that the
96. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] State is free as a matter
of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court
holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards."). Further, "a State
may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law
when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them." Id. (citations omitted);
see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (reiterating standard set in
Hass).
97. At least thirteen states have adopted some form of the per se approach.
See, e.g., COLO. REX. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2002) (adopting per se approach); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-137 (2002) (same); IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1 (2002) (same); IowA
CODE §§ 232.11, 232.45 (2002) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-331 (1999)
(same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (Mitchie 1999) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
595 (2002) (same); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 10, §7303-3.1 (2002) (same); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 51.09-51.10 (Vernon 2002) (same); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2(1) (2002)
(same); see also generally In re Doe, 978 P.2d 684, 686 (Haw. 1999) (same); Com-
monwealth v. AJuvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654 (Ma. 1983) (same); In re ETC, 449 A.2d
937 (Vt. 1982) (same).
98. See Feld, supra note 89, at 118-19 (outlining varying ways in which states
apply interested adult rule). Some states mandate that law enforcement officials
give juveniles the opportunity to consult with an interested adult, inform both par-
ent and child of the child's Miranda rights and that the adult and child consent to
the waiver of the child's rights. See id. at 117 (reviewing differences among states'
interested adult standards). Other states add the additional requirement that the
adult be present for questioning. See id. (differentiating between interested adult
rules adopted by states). Some states have a bifurcated system where children be-
low fourteen must consult with an interested adult, but children above that age
need only be afforded the opportunity to consult. See id. at 118 (discussing differ-
ences between states' interested adult standards). Compare CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-137 (requiring presence of parent or guardian only), with W. VA. CODE § 49-
5-2 (requiring presence of counsel or parent). Legal commentators have also
voiced concerns regarding this approach. Objections include: (1) it may allow
guilty persons to go free; (2) it increases uncertainty about whether the waiver will
be admissible in court; (3) it is inflexible; (4) it may increase collateral litigation;
(5) it does not allow judges to consider the interests of society; (6) it is too strin-
gent in cases of older, more mature juveniles; (7) it hampers police investigations;
(8) it still requires discretion of the court in deciding who should be an interested
adult; and (9) it is too cumbersome or costly. See, e.g., Schlam, supra note 89, at
917-23 (noting problems with interested adult approach including failure to ade-
quately consider interest of society in protecting itself from juvenile crime and
parent's incompetence in advising their children during interrogation); see also
Brobst, supra note 95, at 625-27 (voicing concerns regarding increase of uncer-
tainty about whether waiver is valid, and increased pressures on child created by
parents' presence); McGuire, supra note 95, at 1380 (expressing concern over un-
clear expression of who qualifies as interested adult); Trey Meyer, Comment, Test-
ing the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-Incrimination Privilege in the Juvenile
Courts, 47 KAN. L. REV. 1035, 1076-77 (1999) (criticizing interested adult rule for
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adult could act as an advisor to the child and reduce coercive pressures of
the interrogation atmosphere. 99
C. Two-Tiered Rules: The Minority Approach
A minority of courts have adopted a two-tiered scheme, sometimes
referred to as "the rule of fourteen." 1°) Under this bifurcated plan, states
divide juveniles into two groups by age, with children below a specified age
receiving more protection than those above that age.")' If the child is
below the specified age, usually fourteen, any statement that he or she has
made is inadmissible per se unless the child has had the opportunity to
consult with an "interested adult."10 2 Children above the specified age
either undergo the totality-balancing test or the prosecution must over-
come a presumption that the confession was involuntary. 103 Under the
latter approach, the prosecution must demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the confession was not coerced. 10 4
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH: EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING TO THE
VALIDITY OF JUVENILES' MIRANDA WAIVERS
If we accept adult interrogation procedures as the gold standard for
comparison, one would expect that if Miranda procedures hold equal
meaning for juveniles, they would result in similar rates of utilization and
waiver of rights for both groups. 10 5 In other words, if juveniles' compe-
tence to waive their rights is comparable to that of adults, we would expect
to see similar rates of utilization and waiver of rights by adults and
juveniles. Nevertheless, research demonstrates that compared to adults,
juveniles rarely exercise the constitutional rights conferred upon them by
preventing juveniles from confessing and focusing process on will of interested
adult).
99. See Feld, supra note 89, at 117 (delineating states' rationales for interested
adult rule). Other rationales have included that the interested adult rule will:
[m]itigate the dangers of untrustworthiness, reduce coercive influences
... provide an independent witness who can testify about any coercive
practices that police used . . . assure the accuracy of any statements ob-
tained, involve parents in the process, . . . ensure that police fully advise
and ajuvenile Actually understand those advisories [sic], and relieve po-
lice of the burden of making judgments about a youth's competency.
Id.
100. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-331 (2002) (providing example of two-
tiered approach).
101. For a further discussion of the implementation of the interested adult
standard, see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-331 (providing example of statute re-
quiring that child confer with interested adult when below specified age).
103. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595 (2002) (invoking two-tiered rule).
104. See id. (providing example of interested adult rule).
105. SeeTHOMAS GRISSO,JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 106 (1981) (comparing
juveniles' and adults' levels of Miranda comprehension).
[Vol. 48: p. 629
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the Court in Gault. 1 6 In fact, children have only availed themselves of
their right to remain silent in nine to eleven percent of cases, while adults
have avoided self-incrimination in forty percent of cases."' 7
This finding begs the question: Is there something unique tojuveniles
that might affect their competency to waive Miranda under existing proce-
dures and, if so, what procedures might better ensure that juveniles' waiv-
ers are "knowing, intelligent and voluntary?"' 0 8 The psychological
literature may offer some answers.
A. Juveniles Lack of Comprehension of Miranda
Children are not born with the ability to reason logically, use abstract
concepts, weigh consequences of actions and evaluate hypothetical situa-
tions. 10 9 All of these skills, which are needed for effective decision-making
and comprehension, continue to develop throughout early adoles-
cence.1 10 Nevertheless, by age fifteen, children have acquired basic intel-
lectual abilities akin to those of adults. 1 1 In fact, researchers have found
106. See Thomas Grisso & C. Pomiciter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, I Lxw & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339
(1977) (demonstrating enormous disparity between adults' and juveniles' utiliza-
tion of Miranda rights).
107. See id. at 339 (comparing adult and juvenile rates of Miranda waiver).
Younger juveniles are even less likely to exercise their rights. See id. (stating that
younger children are less likely to assert their rights than older children or adults).
While much of this research was performed during the late 1970s, more re-
cent research has confirmed that Grisso's results hold true for adolescents today.
See Naomi E. Goldstein et al., Risk Factors for False Confessions in Adolescent Of-
fenders, Address at the European Association of Psychology and Law Conference,
Lisbon, Portugal Uune 2001) (paper on file with author) (recreating and building
upon Grisso's original research from 1970s and concluding that "adolescent of-
fenders' Miranda comprehension in the early 21st century is similar to the levels of
understanding of delinquent boys in 1970s. Despite speculation that youth are
more knowledgeable about police interactions and Miranda rights than children
... three decades ago, this research suggests ... children's Miranda comprehen-
sion has not significantly improved").
108. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (establishing know-
ing, intelligent and voluntary as standard for evaluation of validity of waiver of
Miranda rights).
109. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 18 (asserting that problem solving
abilities and formal reasoning continue to develop throughout adolescence, for
example, one study reviewed by Grisso demonstrated that older adolescents were
more likely than younger adolescents to think strategically in hypothetical legal
cases).
110. See id. (examining development of cognitive capacities).
111. See id. (reviewing literature on cognitive development of adolescents and
concluding that "at least by age 15 adolescent-adult differences in cognitive capaci-
ties to make choices are minimal" and attributing these differences to "differences
in motivation, in functioning under stress, and in individual differences in rates of
cognitive development"). But see Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 25 (stating
juvenile's cognitive abilities are like those of adults by age 17).
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that their ability to comprehend Miranda rights as compared to adults
plateaus around the same time.' 12
Nevertheless, simple understanding of the rights themselves is not the
only component of a competent waiver of Miranda."3 Understanding the
meaning of the rights is only one element of a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver. 114 Juveniles also need to appreciate the significance of
their rights in the legal context.' 
15
Miranda warnings advise suspects that they have options, but knowl-
edge of these options is meaningless without an understanding of their
function.' I  One study examining juveniles found that juveniles often
have misconceptions about the function and significance of Miranda
rights." 7 Compared to both adults with and without experience in the
judicial system, juveniles were significantly less likely to understand the
significance and function of their rights.' 18 Consequently, they were less
competent to waive both the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel.' 19
112. See GRIsso, supra note 105, at 106 ("Miranda scores at juvenile ages in-
crease through the 14-year-old group, beyond which mean scores do not increase
appreciably with successive age groups into adult years."). Because this Note is
arguing that protections for minors be increased so that their constitutional rights
have meaning equivalent to those of adults, the appropriate comparison group for
the purposes of this Note is an adult population. Nevertheless, other research has
evaluated juveniles against an absolute standard. See id. at 88 (comparing
juveniles' comprehension of Miranda to absolute standard and demonstrating that
when this slightly different question is asked, children fare much worse).
113. See id. at 44-45 (asserting that necessary components for valid waiver in-
clude juveniles' comprehension of their rights,juveniles' problem solving capacity
and their beliefs about legal context and role these rights play in legal arena).
114. See id. at 109 (explaining informing juvenile suspects of Miranda rights
themselves is not sufficient for "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" waiver of rights
and stating that "to know one has choices is of limited value if one does not also
have an understanding of the significance and function of those choices within the
legal system").
115. See id. at 109-10 (clarifying that "knowing, intelligent and voluntary"
waiver requires understanding of finction of rights within legal process and defin-
ing this component with two subparts: (1) ' juveniles' expectancies about the per-
sonal consequences of waiving or asserting Miranda rights" and (2) 'Juveniles'
perceptions of the intended functions of the rights to silence and legal counsel").
116. See id. at 109 (differentiating between knowledge of Miranda rights and
understanding their function within legal process).
117. See id. at 128 (explaining finding that juveniles misunderstand function
and significance of their Miranda rights is especially true for those with IQ scores
below 90).
118. See id. (finding that only exception to this rule was juveniles with numer-
ous contacts with legal system, defined as juveniles "referred for felony charges
three or more times" and explaining this group understood their rights as well as
adults who had no previous personal contact with legal system).
119. See id. (concluding 'juveniles' competence to waive their rights to silence
and counsel is seriously diminished by their inferior understanding of the function
and significance of those rights").
650 [Vol. 48: p. 629
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For example, nearly one-third of juveniles endorsed the belief that
attorneys defend the innocent, but not the guilty.120 With respect to their
right to silence, juveniles sixteen and under consistently scored poorly
when compared to either an absolute standard or to their adult counter-
parts. 121 Nearly a third ofjuveniles thought that police could try to per-
suade them to give up their right to silence and over half believed that
judges could revoke this right even if they had previously asserted it. 122
Further, nearly two-thirds of juveniles did not adequately understand that
they could not be punished for asserting their rights.' 2 3
Another key component of understanding the function of Miranda
rights is understanding the concept of a right itself.124 Children, unlike
adults, often fail to think of a right as an entitlement that cannot be re-
voked. 125 Unlike adults, delinquent juveniles believed a right was some-
120. See id. at 129 (finding one-third of children "with few or no prior felony
referrals believed that defense attorneys defend the interests of the innocent but
not the guilty" and suggesting one solution would be to allow the public defenders
themselves to explain their role prior to interrogation).
121. See id. at 123 (finding adjudicated juveniles below age 16 did not under-
stand their rights adequately compared to those 17 and above, while sixteen year
olds understanding was inadequate compared to those over age 20 and demon-
strating their understanding is poor compared to absolute standard as evidenced
by the large percentage of inadequate responses).
122. See id. (revealing only 36.7 percent ofjuveniles did not understand that
police could not revoke their right to silence and 55.3 percent did not understand
judges could not revoke this right).
123. See id. (demonstrating only 33.2 percent ofjuveniles adequately under-
stood they could not be penalized for asserting their rights).
124. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 10-11 (discussing children's con-
ception of right). Psychological theory indicates that there are several ways one
might conceive of a right. Those with a preconventional view believe that a right is
controlled by authority figures and a person may exercise this right only when
someone in control allows them. See id. (explaining preconventional view of
rights). The more advanced conventional view sees a right as a social compact for
the collective benefit of the group. See id. (explaining conventional view of rights).
Generally, research demonstrates that preadolescents view rights in a preconven-
tional way, which during adolescence gives way to conventional views. See id. (con-
cluding at least one third of juveniles have "conventional" view of right, as
controlled by authority figures, until around age fifteen or sixteen; it is only later
thatjuveniles develop adult-like conceptions that right is agreement between mem-
bers of society for their common benefit). A third, more advanced or complex
view of a right is also possible. See id. (explaining third conception of rights).
Under this conceptualization, called the postconventional view, a right is seen as
derived from universal principles, however, research shows that even few adults
develop a postconventional conceptualization of a right. See id. (clarifying that
people rarely hold most complex view of right).
125. See Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyer's in Promoting Juvenile's Competence as
Defendants, inYouTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ONJUVENILEJUsTIcE
244 (Thomas Gisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (stating children often do
not understand that their rights are "within their exclusive control to assert or
waive"); see also GRISso, supra note 105, at 130 (finding majority ofjuveniles as well
as adults "view[ed] a right as an allowance which is bestowed by and can therefore
be revoked by the authorities" and explaining the "majority in this study" took this
view); Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youth's Capacities, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
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thing they were allowed to do, not an entitlement guaranteed by social
contract. 126 To children, rights are not absolute but, instead, are doled
out by authority figures that may arbitrarily retract them at their
discretion. 127
For example, several studies have found that most adolescents be-
tween fifteen and sixteen years old did not conceive of their rights as an
entitlement.1 28 Further, children did not interpret attempts at coercion
as a violation of their rights, but rather a change in the rules by the person
in authority who granted the rights.1 29 This research leads to the conclu-
sion that minors who do not believe that Miranda rights are meaningful or
who have learned through experience that they are not significant, are
unlikely to assert these rights during interrogation.1 3
Even after children have acquired adult-like cognitive abilities, they
may not consistently employ these skills because of other incomplete de-
velopmental processes. 1 -3 Under stress or in new situations, both of which
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ONJUVENILEJUSTICE 148-49 (Thomas Grisso & Robert
G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter Grisso, Capacities] (finding children believe
their rights are retractable).
126. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 10-11 (reviewing literature on ado-
lescents' understanding of abstract concept of right and concluding that juveniles
conceive rights as controlled by authority rather than as legal entitlement).
127. See GRISSO, supra note 105, at 130 (finding juveniles and adults believe
their rights are bestowed upon them by authority figures and, therefore, may be
revoked by authorities); see also Buss, supra note 125, at 259-60 (stating children
believe adults may revoke their constitutional rights during interrogation and ex-
plaining that this may be tied to juveniles' views of adults' authority over them);
Grisso, Capacities, supra note 125, at 148-49 (reviewing research illustrating that
juveniles believe their rights are conditional and not absolute); Grisso Competence,
supra note 1, at 10-11 (reviewing literature finding that children believe that au-
thorities may revoke their rights).
128. See Grisso, Capacities, supra note 125, at 148-49 (discussing research show-
ingjuveniles age fifteen to sixteen believed their rights were irrevocable and ex-
plaining most juveniles, at this age, were likely to conceive of right as something
one is "allowed to do"). But see id. (comparing Melton's research demonstrating by
age fourteen children endorsed belief that rights were irrevocable entitlements,
but pointing out that Melton inappropriately used sample from general popula-
tion of adolescents rather than delinquent adolescents to whom he wished to gen-
eralize his results); see also Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 310-11 (comparing
Read's and Melton's research on tendency of adolescents to misunderstand con-
cept of rights and believe that their rights are revocable by authority figures and
concluding that Read's findings were more reliable due to superior design using
juvenile delinquent population, which was the group about which both researchers
were trying to draw conclusions).
129. See Buss, supra note 125, at 245 (discussing finding that attempt at coer-
cion of confession is not interpreted as violation of rights by juvenile but rather as
"a change in, or explication of, the rules, which is perceived as coming straight
from the rulemaker").
130. See id. (explaining children may come to believe rights are not meaning-
ful through experience with courts).
131. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing fact that juveniles
do not utilize their newly attained skills uniformly across situations and explaining
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occur during interrogation, invoking these skills is even less likely.,'3 2 Fur-
ther, it is also possible that children apply these abilities inconsistently be-
cause they lack experience, which would inform an older individual of the
appropriate times to use these abilities. 133 Thus, while they have the raw
ability to use these skills, this deficiency leaves them bereft of the underly-
ing fund of information that would inform the decision of an older
individual. 1
34
B. The Failures of the Interested Adult
Since Haley, the Supreme Court has not mandated an interested
adult's presence, but has suggested that the presence of an interested
adult would aid a juvenile during custodial interrogations. 3- 5 Numerous
law review articles also recommend the adoption of the per se or "inter-
ested adult" rule, often criticizing the "totality of the circumstances"
that exhibiting effective use of these skills is less likely in new, ambiguous or stress-
ful situations).
132. See id. (explaining that juveniles are less likely to use new skills uniformly
in novel or demanding situations); Grisso, Capacities, supra note 125, at 158-59 (re-
viewing literature on juvenile's cognitive abilities and effect of emotion on their
capacity to reason as compared to adults).
133. See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 26 (explaining that prior expe-
rience may account for differences between adults' and juveniles' use of skills).
134. See id. (explaining adults' experience may aid them in making deci-
sions). One final characteristic of juvenile delinquents may hinder their compe-
tence to waive Miranda. Among the juvenile delinquent population there is a
higher incidence of mental illness, cognitive deficits, learning disabilities and emo-
tional disorders that hinderjuvenile development. Goldstein et al., supra note 107,
at 5-6 ("[A]pproximately 27% of males and more than 80% of females in juvenile
facilities meet current diagnostic criteria for mental disorders, even when conduct
disorder is excluded."). This means that while many youths develop their cogni-
tive abilities by the age of fourteen or fifteen, others lag behind and will not obtain
these skills until later adolescence. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 3, at 87 (dis-
cussing lack of understanding, even among psychologists, of effects of mental ill-
ness on perceptions of juvenile adjudicative competence and explaining mental
illnesses among juveniles may not be detected due to differences in way same dis-
orders manifest themselves in adults). See generally R. Otto et al., Prevalence of
Mental Disorders Among Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in RESPONDING TO THE
MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7-48 U. Cocozza
ed., 1992) (examining frequencies of mental disorders among juvenile
delinquents).
135. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56 (1967) (suggesting presence of par-
ents during interrogation would be beneficial to child); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (implying that children need benefit of parent or counsel in
order to assert their rights).
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test. ,1 3 6 Some states have also legislatively or judicially required the pres-
ence of an interested adult for juveniles' statements to be valid at trial.' 37
The expected benefits of the interested adult rule are twofold. Propo-
nents of this approach expect that, during interrogation, an adult should
protect the interests of the child by (1) helping him or her understand
and weigh the option of waiving rights and (2) decreasing the coercive
atmosphere of the interrogation. 13 8 Advocates of the interested adult rule
believe that by having a parent or other interested adult present, the child
will feel less coerced to speak to the police and will either exercise his or
her rights or validly waive them more often.
13 9
Psychological research calls into question whether this standard actu-
ally achieves the desired purpose. 14 0 In fact, for many years, psychologists
have recognized that the presence of an interested adult may not help the
child and may actually hurt the child's chances of understanding and as-
serting his or her rights. 14 1 In fact, research conducted shortly after the
creation of the interested adult rule found a trend toward a decrease in
the assertion of rights when parents were present. 1
4 2
136. See, e.g., Raymond Chao, Note, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple as A-B-C, 21
WiiiITIER L. REV. 521, 547 (2000) (advocating interested adult standard); Huang,
supra note 95, at 473-76 (supporting per se rules); Krzewinski, supra note 95, at
370-83 (advocating abandonment of totality test in favor of interested adult or per
se rule); McGuire, supra note 95, at 1383-86 (supporting interested adtlt rule).
But see Brobst, supra note 95, at 634 (advocating two-tiered approach and criticizing
totality standard); Meyer, supra note 98, at 1035 (advocating totality of circum-
stances approach).
137. For a listing of states that have invoked the interested adult standard for
evaluation ofjuveniles' waiver of Miranda rights and explanation of that standard,
see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
138. See Feld, supra note 89, at 117 (delineating states' rationales for inter-
ested adult rule).
139. See id. at 117 (articulating rationale for interested adult rule). Other ra-
tionales have included that the interested adult rule will:
[m]itigate the dangers of untrustworthiness, reduce coercive influences,
... provide an independent witness who can testify about any coercive
practices that police used,... assure the accuracy of any statements ob-
tained, involve parents in the process .... ensure that police fully advise
and a juvenile actually understand those advisories [sic], and relieve po-
lice of the burden of making judgments about a youth's competency.
Id. (outlining reasons for interested adult standard).
140. See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 105, at 161-90 (finding interested adult rule
does not aid children in exercising their rights).
141. See Grisso & Pomiciter, supra note 106, at 340 (finding parental presence
did not increase frequency of children's assertion of rights to same level found
with adults).
142. See id. at 340-41 (citing P. Keith-Speigel, Children's Rights as Participants in
Research, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 53-81 (G.P.
Koocher ed., 1976) for proposition that parents actually contribute to coercive
atmosphere and explaining that their study found that "court monitoring and par-
ent advice during interrogation did not significantly alter [past] patterns" of
juveniles consistently waiving their rights).
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While it may seem counterintuitive, psychologist Thomas Grisso
found that parents do not help, and sometimes hurt, children's chances of
asserting their rights or validly waiving them. 14 3 Researchers have asked
parents what advice they would give their children in hypothetical interro-
gation situations.1 44 The majority of parents felt that children should not
be able to remain silent, as their Miranda rights would allow. 45 Grisso
inferred that 55-60 percent of the parents who opposed juveniles with-
holding information would instruct their children to cooperate with po-
lice. 146 Only about half of parents indicated they would advise their
children to exercise their right to an attorney.'
47
Parental advice is even worse in actual interrogation situations. 148 In
a related study, a juvenile court tested parents' reactions under actual in-
terrogation conditions.1 49  Parents generally offered no advice to their
143. See GRIsso, supra note 105, at 168-90 (describing study finding that ma-
jority of time parents offer no advice to their children during interrogation, or
instruct their children to speak to police and not to obtain attorney).
144. See id. at 171-72 (describing directions given to parents and form used to
query parents as to what type of advice they would give if their child were
interrogated).
145. See id. at 175 (discussing results of study on parents' attitudes toward
juveniles' Miranda rights). Parents read a statement asserting that children
"should be allowed to withhold information from police when suspected of a
crime." See id. (describing study methodology). In sample one, 53.6 percent of
parents disagreed with this statement, 25.5 percent were neutral and 20.9 percent
agreed. See id. (finding parents endorsed belief that children cannot withhold in-
formation from police). In sample two, 55.0 percent disagreed, 25.8 percent were
neutral and 19.2 percent agreed with the statement. See id. (replicating study with
second sample).
146. See id. at 180 (inferring that parents who believe their children should
not withhold information from police would also advise their children to speak
with police). Overall, one third of parents thought their child should cooperate,
while two-thirds believed their child should remain silent. See id. (discussing find-
ings of study). But, despite their endorsement of their child's silence, Grisso
found evidence that many parents only intended temporary silence to avoid an
inaccurate statement and that they expected their child to eventually speak with
the police. See id. at 182 (summarizing studies about parents' reasoning and advice
to their children during interrogation).
Researchers categorized the rationale of the one-third of parents that gave
advice to speak to the police about their involvement. See id. at 180-81 (explaining
and giving examples of categories). The percentage of parents in sample one and
sample two, respectively, giving the following reasons were: (1) moralistic (40.5,
27.8); (2) responsibility (18.3, 21.1); (3) strategic (37.7, 46.7); (4) other (3.2, 3.3).
See id. at 180 (presenting results of categorization of parents' reasons for advising
children to speak with police).
147. See id. at 181 (finding parent's advised children to obtain lawyer in 57
percent and 58 percent of cases for samples one and two, respectively, and finding
all parents who advised obtaining attorney also advised silence).
148. See id. at 183 (studying parents and their children under actual interro-
gation conditions).
149. See id. (examining actual interrogation conditions). The juvenile court
designed and conducted the study. See id. (explaining methodology of study).
Grisso aided court personnel with the statistics and published the results. See id.
(describing process for obtaining data). In this study, the court monitored and
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children or did not even speak with their children. 150 When parents did
speak with their children during interrogation, they recommended waiver
of rights. 15 1 Further, parents often failed to seek additional information
for their children or to ask to speak with their children privately.
152
These results imply that, in interrogation situations, parents fre-
quently fail to provide the advice and assistance envisioned by states when
they implemented interested adult rules.' 5-" Parents do not offer the ad-
vice and counsel the Supreme Court thought would protect children from
their own immaturity. 154 In fact, Grisso's research revealed that parental
presence does not serve as a substitute for representation.
55
While parents offer no advice in many situations, they often put addi-
tional pressure on their children during interrogation. 156 Children may
feel pressured to make up stories in front of their parents or, even worse,
parents may put direct pressure on them to confess. 15 7 Parents may co-
recorded parent-child communications during the interrogation process. See id.
(stating methods for data collection). In this jurisdiction, parents must be noti-
fied, and decisions regarding the minor's rights must be recorded before the child
can be questioned. See id. at 184 (recounting jurisdiction's requirements for
juveniles' waiver of Miranda).
150. See id. at 185-86 (finding in 71.3% of cases, parents told child nothing
about his or her right to silence and in 81.3% of cases, parents told him or her
nothing about his or her right to attorney).
151. See id. (discussing finding that in 16.7% of cases, parent told child to
waive his or her right to silence and in 11.3% of cases parent told child to waive his
or her right to representation). In only 5.6% of cases, the parent advised the child
not to talk and in 2.3% of cases, parents advised the child to assert their right to an
attorney. See id. (recounting paucity of cases in which parents advise children to
assert their rights). Finally, in 66.2% of cases parents did not communicate at all
with their child. See id. (revealing that majority of interrogations occur without
parents communicating anything to child).
152. See id. (asserting that parents generally do not ask for additional informa-
tion or private consultation with their child and providing example that only 4.4%
of parents asked court officer for more information and only 8.7% asked to speak
to their child privately).
153. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 596 (1948) (suggesting child needs
help of trusted adult such as parent during interrogation).
154. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962) (stating children
need protection of parents during interrogation due to their immaturity).
155. See GRIsSO, supra note 105, at 190 (expressing agreement with court's
decision in K.E.S. v. State, 216 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. 1975), that "we cannot equate
physical presence of a parent with meaningful representation").
156. See GRISSO, supra note 105, at 167 (stating that parents may put addi-
tional pressure on their children during interrogation).
157. See Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation and "Self' Incrimination of Chil-
dren by Parents: A Problem Not Yet Solved, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 619, 620 (1973)
(stating children may feel pressured by parent's presence); see also GRIsso, supra
note 105, at 167 (citing P. Piersma et al., The Juvenile Court: Current Problems, Legisla-
tive Proposals, and a ModelAct, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 1, 1-99 (1975), KE.S., 216 S.E.2d at
670, 673, and In re Carter, 318 A.2d 269, 272 (1974)) (stating that parents may
coerce children to confess during interrogation, which increases pressure on child,
or may even have interests averse to child's needs). Grisso also notes that avoid-
ance of attorney fees may be an additional motive for parents to assert pressure on
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erce their children to make a statement because of embarrassment at be-
ing called to the police station, anger with their children or a desire for
their children to be truthful or learn a lesson.1 58 Further, adult status
does not make one immune to coercion. 159 Parents themselves may feel
intimidated by the atmosphere of the interrogation and, consequently, ex-
ert pressure on their children.
1 60
While the underlying rationale for the interested adult standard is
that a parent understands Miranda rights and, therefore, can explain the
rights to their child, this may not be the case.' 6' Studies of adult compre-
hension of Miranda have illustrated that, while faring better than their
adolescent counterparts, adult comprehension was far from perfect. 16 2
Without a reasonable understanding of these rights, parents cannot pro-
vide meaningful counsel to their children.
C. Suggestibility and Compliance Among Adolescents
Children's compliance'1 63 and suggestibility164 also work against them
in interrogation. 165 Psychological research demonstrates that children are
more compliant and suggestible than adults. 16 6 Children are not only
more likely to change their stories under pressure, but stressful situations
their children. See id. (describing parental motivations for encouraging child's
confession).
158. See Grisso & Pomiciter, supra note 106, at 340 (listing parents' reasons for
forcing their children to confess including anger, teaching obedience to authority,
emphasizing responsibility for one's actions or belief that confession will result in
leniency).
159. See Schlam, supra note 157, at 620 (stating parents themselves may feel
pressured when their child is interrogated).
160. See id. (discussing fact that parents may provide additional pressures be-
cause they directly compel child to cooperate, therefore, child may feel need to
make up stories in front of parent or parent may even feel coerced themselves).
161. See GRisso, supra note 105, at 98-101 (demonstrating adults' comprehen-
sion of Miranda may be inadequate).
162. See id. at 98-105 (describing study demonstrating adults' poor Miranda
comprehension).
163. Compliance is "a subject's tendency to go along with instructions and
directions without actual acceptance of the premises." Johnson & Hunt, supra
note 23, at 24 (defining compliance as used in psychological literature).
164. Suggestibility is "how a subject's memory and beliefs are influenced and
manipulated during interrogation." Id. (defining suggestibility as used in psycho-
logical literature).
165. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-legal Perspectives on Children's
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992) (stating that children comply with desires
of police during interrogation because they are socialized to follow directions of
authority figures); see also Goldstein et al., supra note 107, at 9 (statingjuveniles are
more easily coerced due to suggestibility).
166. See Goldstein et al., supra note 107, at 9 ("U]uveniles are also more sug-
gestible [than adults] and, therefore, may be more easily coerced by police during
interrogations.") (citations omitted).
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may actually change their perception of an event. 167 This means that they
may come to believe a distorted version of the events if enough coercive
pressure is placed upon them. 1" 8
Some commentators have linked this suggestibility and compliance in
children with extreme stress such as the pressure exerted during interro-
gation. 169 Additionally, this phenomenon is particularly pronounced with
children and younger adolescents. 17o Delinquent adolescents are particu-
larly susceptible to these effects when questions are repeated or negative
feedback is given by an authority figure such as a police officer during an
interrogation. 17' This effect is present even when IQ and memory scores
are statistically controlled, revealing that age is a determining factor in the
167. See Johnson & Hunt, supra note 23, at 29, 32 (reviewing literature on
ability of coercive police techniques including implanting leading information in
questions and forcing yes/no answers to cause false confessions and also discussing
fact that juveniles are more susceptible to these techniques, which may cause im-
plantation of false information into juvenile's account of events). When pressed
by adult disapproval of their version of events, children will change their story and
are more likely than adults to incorporate false or leading information into a new
story even without coercive pressure. See id. at 29 (citing G. GuI)JONSSON, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND TESTIMONY (1992) for proposi-
tion that when juveniles are repeatedly asked leading questions they are more
likely to submit to pressure than adults). For example, in several studies, children
were found to incorporate facts known to be false into their story even without
coercive pressure. This occurs by the adult simply infusing the question with mis-
leading information. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing that
"younger adolescents were significantly more likely than adults to change their
stories"); see also Rachel Sutherland & Harlene Hayne, Age-Related Changes in the
Misinformation Effect, 79 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILI) PSYCHOL. 338, 338-404 (2001)
(studying effect of infusing question with misleading information and concluding
that children are more likely than adults to incorporate this information into their
version of events even though information infused was false).
168. SeeJohnson & Hunt, supra note 23, at 29 (showing that use of coercive
techniques may change person's perception of event, even if new version is actu-
ally false, and finding that children are more likely to be susceptible to interroga-
tive pressure).
169. See Goldstein et al., supra note 107, at 3 (stating that "previous research
suggests that stress is related to suggestibility").
170. See id. ("[T]he risk [of increased suggestibility] is particularly pro-
nounced with younger adolescents.").
171. See G. Richardson et al., Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent Forensic
Population, 18J. ADOLESCENCE 211, 215 (1995) ("The present study indicates that
an adolescent forensic sample... may be inherently suggestible. This has implica-
tion [sic] for police interviewing techniques, in that interviewers should be careful
not to place adolescent witnesses and suspects tinder undue pressure by criticizing
their answers."). Further, "even repeating the same questions on a number of oc-
casions may act as negative feedback and result in subjects altering their answers
merely to agree with the interviewer." Id. Additional research has specifically
demonstrated the ability of the police tactics, described earlier in this Note, to
produce confessions from innocent suspects. SeeJohnson & Hunt, supra note 23,
at 24 (reviewing H. Wakefield & R. Underwager, Coerced orNonvoluntary Confessions,
16 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 423-40 (1998) to demonstrate that techniques advocated by
most widely used police manual can induce confessions in innocent suspects).
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tendency for juveniles to submit to coercive pressure.172 Further, chil-
dren's socialization to comply with authority figures makes them even less
likely to assert their rights. 
173
V. PROPOSAL
The studies reviewed above, taken together, cast doubt on whether
juveniles are competent to waive their constitutional rights during interro-
gation. 174 If the goal of the strategies currently used by state governments
is truly to ensure a "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" waiver of Miranda,
states need to adjust current procedures to provide better protection for
juveniles. However, any revised procedures should be balanced to provide
for the interests of society in punishing the guilty. In other words, an in-
creased level of protection for juveniles is needed, but only to the extent
172. See Richardson et al., supra note 171, at 215 (noting that, when partici-
pants are matched on memory scores and IQ age is more likely responsible than
criminality in causing respondents to change their answers between trials); Gold-
stein et al., supra note 107, at 11 ("Holding IQ and Miranda Comprehension con-
stant, only age significantly predicted false confessions.").
173. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 16 (asserting that when authority
figures suggest disapproval with children's stories, children are more likely to
change their version of events than adults and are more prone to offer inaccurate
information if pressed); see also Koocher, supra note 165, at 716 (asserting that
children may feel requests are actually commands, despite how they are phrased
and are more likely to comply with police requests, or at least are more reluctant to
assert their rights during interrogation because of their socialization to follow di-
rectives of authority figures).
174. For a review of psychological evidence suggesting that Current proce-
dures used to evaluate juveniles' waivers of Miranda may be deficient, see supra
notes 105-73 and accompanying text. Evidence is also mounting that juveniles'
lack of future perspective may also affect their ability to competently waive their
rights. Children, especially delinquent youths, often do not consider the future
consequences of their behavior. Often immediate gratification is chosen rather
than short-term sacrifice in order to achieve long-term gain. See Koocher, supra
note 165, at 716 (stating that juveniles have difficulty sacrificing in short term for
long term gain due to developmental stage).
Grisso found that when children were asked to imagine waiving their rights,
they discussed the immediate gratification of the promise they could go home if
they confessed. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 1, at 20 (illustrating that children
value short term gain over long term gain). Those fourteen years old and younger
were more likely to focus solely on short-term gains. See id. (discussing findings).
This finding is further complicated by delinquents' regular surroundings. See id.
(offering explanations for juvenile delinquents preference for short term over
long-term gain). Often living in poor neighborhoods where violence is frequent,
the youth has feelings of a foreshortened future or an inability to escape violence.
See id. (giving reasons for observed phenomenon). This leads to a lack of careful
consideration of options and long-term consequences. See id. (demonstrating kids
chose short-term gain over long-term gain and proposing developmental and envi-
ronmental explanations for this phenomenon). But see Grisso, Capacities, supra
note 125, at 162 (urging caution in interpreting findings thatjuveniles value short
term over long term gain due to lack of comparison to adults in adjudication pro-
cess and noting that "gaps in our knowledge in this area are considerable").
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necessary to provide protection at least equivalent to that afforded
adults. '
75
Research demonstrates that the current approaches fail to provide
juveniles with a meaningful equivalent of the protection guaranteed
adults.1 76 We have seen that the interested adult rule fails because par-
ents, who most frequently function as the interested adult, are not provid-
ing the guidance the court envisioned.17 7 Thus, if the purpose is truly to
protect children, and is no longer to view the juvenile court system as a
benevolent process designed to help them, then advocacy of the interested
adult standard is misplaced.
The totality standard would work only if the trier of fact was apprised
of current psychological research, which he/she frequently is not. 1 78 Fur-
ther, the totality test does not weigh the suggestibility of children, the fail-
ures of the interested adult or children's lack of understanding of their
rights.179 Thus, the question remains, what may be done to aid juveniles
in either exercising or validly waiving their rights?
To afford juveniles equal protection, states should adopt a two-tiered
approach, but in a different form than current versions.1 80 Under the
proposed approach, children under sixteen years would receive the added
protection of the "per se" or "interested adult" rule, but in an altered
175. For a discussion of the adult Miranda standard, see supra notes 40-49 and
accompanying text.
176. For a further discussion of research demonstrating deficiencies of cur-
rent standards for evaluating Miranda waiver, see supra notes 105-73 and accompa-
nying text.
177. For a further discussion of psychological literature concerning the fail-
ure of the interested adult standard, see supra notes 135-62 and accompanying
text.
178. See Richardson, supra note 171, at 215 (stating awareness that juveniles'
suggestibility during interrogation is deficient).
179. For a further discussion of totality of the circumstances test factors, see
supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
180. This author acknowledges that the desire for a bright-line approach in
the juvenile justice system does not fit neatly into the developmental framework of
children. See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 28 (finding children's develop-
ment does not mesh with bright-line legal approaches). This author, therefore,
has erred on the side of caution in protecting the child rather than proposing
more extensive individual evaltations of capacity to waive Miranda for each child
entering the juvenile justice system, which would likely prove impractical and
unworkable.
Further, this Note primarily focuses on children between the ages of twelve
and seventeen. Statistically, pre-adolescent crimes do occur, but are rare. See
Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 22 (finding children do not often commit
crimes before adolescence). For those children eighteen and older, the notion
that they may fairly be treated as adults is firmly imbedded in our judicial system
and the psychological literature supports their adjudication in the adult system.
See id. (asserting that society has generally accepted proposition that those above
age eighteen may be treated as adults).
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form. 181 For juveniles over sixteen, but under the age of majority, the
proposed rule would function similar to current two-tiered rules. 182
For those under age sixteen, two methods of implementing the pro-
posed two-tiered approach are possible. In the first approach, because the
psychological research has shown that the "interested adult" standard does
not have its intended effect, the standard would be used in a modified
form. 18 3 These children would still be accorded "interested adult" protec-
tion, but a lawyer would act as the adult present.' 84 As the Court acknowl-
edged in both Gallegos and Fare, the lawyer occupies a unique position in
our society in guarding the rights of the accused.1 8 5 Thus, rather than
simply offering the attorney as an option, as the current standard allows,
children under age sixteen would automatically be required to consult
with an attorney before they could validly waive their rights.' 8 6
This proposal would remedy the problems of allowing parents, who
often do not comprehend Miranda themselves or who provide no gui-
dance, to serve as advisors to their children during interrogation.' 87 Fur-
ther, consultation with a lawyer would not hinder interrogation any more
than the current standard, which provides the option of consultation with
a lawyer. 18
8
States attempting to invoke this protection will likely encounter oppo-
sition, which is demonstrated by examining the experiences of states that
have tried to implement legislation protecting children's rights.' 8 9 For
181. For further discussion of the "per se" or interested adult rule, see supra
notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
182. For further discussion of two-tiered approaches see supra notes 100-04.
For discussion of how the current proposal differs and the benefits of the pro-
posed approach see infra notes 207-09.
183. For a further discussion of the failure of the interested adult standard,
see supra notes 135-62 and accompanying text.
184. See Kaban & Tobey, supra note 89, at 158 (arguing that providing lawyer
would best protect children's rights during questioning); see also Schlam, supra
note 157, at 620 (advocating presence of lawyer for interrogation considering that
ninety percent of juveniles waive rights voluntarily, but without understanding).
185. For a further discussion of Gallegos and Fare, see supra notes 71-75, 83-87
respectively and accompanying text (discussing evolution of juveniles' Miranda
rights).
186. SeeJennifer Walters, Note, Illinois Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confes-
sions by Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogation of Some Juveniles, 33
LoYoLA U. CHI. L.J. 487, 522-23 (2002) (proposing methods to provide lawyers to
juveniles).
187. See GRisso, supra note 105, at 199-200 (reviewing literature finding that
presence of interested adult does not provide protection for juveniles intended by
courts and legislatures).
188. See Feld, supra note 89, at 120 (asserting that requiring an attorney's
presence would be detrimental to police's ability to interrogate children, "how-
ever, Gault and Miranda already assume juveniles' access to counsel during
interrogation").
189. See Walters, supra note 186, at 513-14 (relating opposition encountered
by Illinois legislators attempting to require that child suspects be afforded counsel
during interrogation).
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example, when Illinois legislators proposed laws that would require an at-
torney to be present during juvenile interrogation, police groups ada-
mantly opposed the bill and the opposition resulted in the passing of a
watered down version.'91° In light of resulting political pressure, a plan
such as this might be unrealistic. 19 1
If political pressure were to make the requirement of an attorney's
presence for interrogations impossible, a second option for those under
age sixteen exists. An alternative proposal, for this younger group, is to
automatically provide the juvenile suspect with a child advocate familiar
with the interrogation process who would discuss Miranda with the
child.9 2 If the government failed to allow this advocate access to the
child, the waiver of rights would be considered invalid and any statements
held inadmissible. 1 9
Depending upon the type ofjurisdiction, the mechanism for provid-
ing an advocate would differ. In an urban setting, where adjudications of
juveniles occur frequently, police stations might be required to have an
advocate available twenty-four hours a day.' 9 4 In less populated areas, an
advocate could simply be on-call. In very rural areas, where juveniles are
190. See id. (discussing political pressures by police advocacy groups in order
to prevent additional protections for juveniles during custodial interrogations).
Proposed versions of the bill required additional protections, including counsel,
during interrogation for suspects under age seventeen. See id. at 510-12 (laying out
legislative history of bill and tracking revisions made before it became law).
191. See id. (discussing reasons offered by police as to why children should not
be provided counsel during interrogation). Another interesting proposal encom-
passed in the literature involves the adoption of interviewing techniques currently
used with child victims for use with child suspects. See Kaban & Tobey, supra note
89, at 158 (proposing applying child witness interviewing procedures by explaining
Miranda warnings in detail "with developmentally appropriate language"). This
has been omitted from the author's proposal because it is unlikely that police
would adjust their interrogation procedures to avoid "manipulation, rewards and
intimidation" that "may tnduly pressure children." See id. (discussing proposal
that police adjust interview techniques with child suspects to avoid false
confessions).
192. The author knows of no one who has made this specific proposal, how-
ever, Grisso does suggest that becatuse juveniles' understanding of the function of
defense attorneys, when an inexperienced juvenile is interrogated, the public de-
fender should first be allowed to explain their role in interrogation proceedings.
See Grisso, supra note 105, at 129 (suggesting possible remedial measure for
juveniles' inadequate understanding of the role of defense attorneys as demon-
strated by Grisso's research which demonstrated that one third of juveniles' with
"few or no prior felony referrals" believed that "defense attorneys defend the inter-
ests of the innocent but not the guilty").
193. This procedure would be similar to how courts currently handle cases
where Miranda warnings were not administered to adults by holding that state-
ments obtained prior to administering Miranda warnings to the suspect inadmissi-
ble. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding unless prosecution
proves warnings were given no statements obtained fr'om defendant are admissi-
ble). For further discussion of Miranda standards, see supra notes 40-49 and ac-
companying text.
194. This author knows of no one who has proposed this idea as a possible
procedure for handling how an advocate might be provided.
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not frequently arrested and the distances between potential advocates'
homes and police stations are too far to travel quickly, a telephone advo-
cacy service could be established. Before an interrogation could begin,
juveniles would be required to call the advocacy line and have their rights
explained.
These child advocates would need to be sure that the children they
are speaking with understand their Miranda rights. 195 One solution is to
adopt Miranda comprehension instruments, such as the one created by
Thomas Grisso, for use in custodial settings. 191 If the child scored below
the average adult score on the Grisso instruments, then he or she would
have access to an attorney; if the child scored above a minimum score, he
or she would be considered to have the capacity to undergo interrogation.
It is critical that the instrument may not be administered by a police of-
ficer.' 9 7 A child advocate must administer it because even the most well-
meaning police officer could encounter a conflict of interest or bias in
scoring comprehension. ' 98
The advocate would utilize only the portions of the Grisso instrument
that correspond to the legal standard of Miranda.199 The legal standard
requires a "knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver, '200 however, psycho-
logical research indicates that the "knowing and intelligent" portions are
of most concern °. 2 11 Thus, advocates would administer only the sections of
the instrument that would inform the advocate if a waiver could be given
(1) "knowingly" (i.e., basic understanding of the words and phrases in the
warnings) and (2) "intelligently" (i.e., the suspect can apply these warn-
ings to legal situations). 2°12 The first requirement, "knowingly," is best ex-
plored through the section of Grisso's instrument asking juveniles to
paraphrase their rights in their own words. 20'3 The second requirement,
195. For further discussion of factors bearing on juveniles' comprehension of
Miranda rights, see supra notes 105-73 and accompanying text.
196. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, INSTRUMENTS FOR ASSESSING UNDERSTANDING
AND APPRECIATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS (1998) (providing instruments widely used
by psychologists in assessment of Miranda comprehension).
197. For further discussion of police tactics during questioning and the at-
mosphere police are trained to create during interrogation, see supra notes 20-39
and accompanying text.
198. For further discussion of the methods police are trained to use to con-
duct interrogations, see supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
199. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring waiver of
rights be made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently").
200. See id. (discussing standard for valid waiver of Miranda rights).
201. For a discussion of juveniles' Miranda comprehension and a review of
psychological literature regarding that comprehension, see supra notes 105-73 and
accompanying text.
202. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498-99 (establishing "knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary" standard for valid waiver of rights).
203. See GRISSO, supra note 105, at 22144 (describing Grisso's Comprehen-
sion of Miranda Rights measure, which is objective method for assessing individ-
ual's understanding of standard Miranda warnings).
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"intelligently," is best explored through the Function of Rights in Interro-
gation (FRI), which asks children to apply those rights and potential con-
sequences of waiving the rights to hypothetical situations.
20 4
These two Miranda instruments would only take seven to ten minutes
to administer and would provide the child's level of comprehension rela-
tive to normative data.20 5 This would inform the assessor whether the
child is of likely competence to waive Miranda or whether the child may
need assistance in order to ensure that his or her waiver is "knowing, intel-
ligent and voluntary."
For suspects over the age of sixteen, the statute would implement a
rule similar to the current two-tiered rules. 20 6 A presumption of the
waiver's invalidity would exist. The burden would be on the prosecution
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was in fact
voluntary.
This proposal differs from current two-tiered rules in its recommen-
dation that the cutoff age cannot fall below sixteen.20 7 Research indicates
that, as a class, juveniles under fifteen years old do not understand their
Miranda rights, while children over this age often comprehend a large por-
tion of their rights. 20 8 Thus, the cutoff should, at a minimum, be raised to
meet this standard of age fifteen, however, further psychological research
encourages raising the age to sixteen.
20 9
Studies indicate that despite the adult-like level of comprehension by
juveniles over age fifteen, additional protection is warranted.2 10 Juveniles,
while well developed enough cognitively to understand the warnings read
to them, are not as emotionally developed, are more suggestible and com-
pliant and do not fully comprehend the function of their rights. 2 11 Thus,
older teens still need some form of additional protection that differs from
204. See id. at 249-72 (explaining use of Grisso Function of Miranda Rights
instrument, which is method to assess juveniles' understanding regarding signifi-
cance of Miranda rights in context of interrogations).
205. See id. (describing use of Grisso instruments).
206. For further discussion of the two-tiered standard, see supra notes 100-04
and accompanying text.
207. For an explanation of the two-tiered standard, see supra notes 100-04 and
accompanying text.
208. For a further discussion of development of juveniles' comprehension of
rights and cognitive development, see supra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
209. For a further discussion of studies about juveniles' misunderstanding of
the concept of a right and their suggestibility, see supra notes 124-30, 163-73 and
accompanying text.
210. For a review of psychological literature concerning juveniles' lack of un-
derstanding of the concept of a right and suggestibility during interrogation, see
supra notes 124-30, 163-73 and accompanying text.
211. See Richardson, et al., supra note 171, at 215 ("[T]his is an important
vulnerability ofjuveniles that should no longer be ignored by interviewers."). For
discussion of the suggestibility and compliance of children, which are especially
pronounced among delinquent populations and during periods of stress, see supra
notes 163-73 and accompanying text. Additionally, juveniles age fifteen and six-
teen with IQs below 80, as is typical for most juvenile offenders, do not understand
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the adult standard. 2 12 For this reason, the states should implement a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard for children in this age range. 2 13
Finally, a two-tiered approach may alleviate fears of reduced confes-
sion rates even if these fears may be unwarranted. 2 14 When Miranda was
first introduced in the 19 60's, a public outcry arose for fear that Miranda
rights would eliminate confessions altogether, however, this expectation
did not pan out. 2 15 It is possible that implementing the type of law sug-
gested in this Note would follow a similar pattern and would not actually
reduce the likelihood of confessions. 2 16 Nonetheless, the two-tiered pro-
posal would increase the likelihood that obtained confessions result from
a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver, as the Supreme Court envi-
sioned, rather than the product of impressionable children in a coercive
atmosphere.2
17
VI. CONCLUSION
While the psychological literature has amassed increasing evidence
that current procedures for assessing juveniles' Miranda waivers are defi-
cient, the legal system has remained stagnant.2 18 If the goal is truly to
ensure a "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" waiver by juveniles, current
procedures need revamping. It is time to reconsider the type of protec-
their rights any better than do children under age fifteen. See GRIsso, supra note
105, at 90 (describing comprehension levels ofjuveniles ages fifteen to sixteen).
212. For further discussion of coercive techniques used by police and psycho-
logical studies showing juveniles' vulnerabilities under the current standards for
judging their Miranda comprehension, which justify increased protection for
juveniles, see supra notes 20-39 and 105-73, respectively, and accompanying text.
213. For a further discussion of the function of two-tiered rules, see supra
notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
214. See LEO & THOMAS, supra note 21, at 75-76, 95-105 (describing fears after
advent of Miranda).
215. See id. (describing police, political, and public outcry against Miranda
and its failure to significantly affect confession rates).
216. See id. at 76 ("The creation [of Miranda rights] has not appreciably af-
fected the confession rate.").
217. It is beyond the scope of this Note to fully discuss implications for other
sensitive populations such as those with mental retardation. For a discussion of
this topic, see generally G. Bargoff, & S. Freedman, Mental Retardation and Mi-
randa, THE CHAMPION, April 6-8, 1988; Fulero, Solomon & Caroline Everington,
Assessing Competency to Waive Miranda Rights in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 19
LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 533 (1995) (discussing Miranda waiver by mentally retarded
persons).
218. For a further discussion of current approaches used to assess juveniles'
waiver of Miranda, and research demonstrating deficiencies in these approaches,
see supra notes 88-173 and accompanying text.
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tions afforded juveniles during custodial interrogation, in light of current
and past empirical evidence, and adjust procedures accordingly. 2 19
Kimberly Larson
219. For a further discussion of psychological evidence that current ap-
proaches are deficient, see supra notes 105-73 and accompanying text.
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